




**FOREIGN  
BROADCAST  
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# ***JPRS Report***

# **Arms Control**



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# Arms Control

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**Foreign Minister in Kazakhstan on Border Troop Cuts, Nuclear Tests**

*OW2411215492 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service  
in Chinese 1135 GMT 24 Nov 92*

[By reporters Hu Hanying (5170 3352 5391) and Ju Mengjun (0215 1322 6511)]

[Text] Alma-Ata, 24 Nov (XINHUA)—Chinese State Councillor and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen said here on the evening of 23 November that the purpose of his visit to Kazakhstan was to expedite the execution of agreements reached between the leaders of two countries, and he added that this purpose was fulfilled.

Qian Qichen made the above remarks in an interview with reporters of the Kazakhstan Central Television Station, Alma-Ata Television, KAZAKHSTAN NEWS AGENCY, KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, and KAZAKHSTAN SOVIET NEWS.

Qian Qichen added that prospects for the development of Sino-Kazakh relations are very bright. He said the two countries have been conducting frequent dialogues, even though Kazakhstan became independent less than a year ago. He expects high-level meetings to be held in both Beijing and Alma-Ata next year.

He also suggested placing priority on developing bilateral economic cooperation. He noted that China and Kazakhstan are linked by common mountains and waterways, and said that both countries feature good conditions for cooperation. There are some 50 Sino-Kazakh joint ventures in Kazakhstan. Although these joint ventures are not large in scale, they have started to yield results. If both sides continue to make efforts, the results will become even greater. The two countries have opened five or six border ports in recent years, built and repaired railways and highways, and established airlinks. These efforts will promote bilateral economic cooperation.

When touching on the issue of the Sino-Kazakh border talks, Qian Qichen said the talks had resumed in October, when they were held between China and a joint delegation formed by Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. The Sino-Kazakh border, which extends more than 1,700 kilometers, had formerly been a part of

the border between China and the Soviet Union. Agreements were reached for most areas along the border in earlier talks, but negotiations are continuing on specific pending issues.

Referring to the issue of China's attitude on the suspension of nuclear tests, Qian Qichen said: China supports the comprehensive prohibition and complete destruction of nuclear weapons. As for nuclear tests, it should be stated that, of all the countries which possess nuclear weapons, China is the one that has conducted the fewest nuclear tests and has maintained the longest intervals between its tests.

On the afternoon of 23 November, Foreign Minister Qian and his party visited a Sino-Kazakh thermos-bottle production plant and a department store set up partially with investments from China's Xinjiang Province.

Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and his party left Alma-Ata for Russia on the morning of 24 November.

**'New Progress' in China-CIS Border Troop Talks**

*OW2811082892 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service  
in Chinese 0618 GMT 28 Nov 92*

[Text] Beijing, 28 Nov (XINHUA)—The eighth round of talks on reducing military forces in border areas and strengthening mutual trust in the military field was held in Beijing from 9 to 27 November. Ambassador Wang Ganghua led the Chinese delegation to the talks, while Solovyev, director of the Asia-Pacific Department of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, led a joint delegation representing Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, and Tajikistan.

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the delegations of the two sides had an extensive [guang fan 1639 3131] and in-depth [shen ru 3234 0354] exchange of views on the contents of relevant agreements in a friendly [you hao 0645 1170] and practical [qiu shi 3061 1395] atmosphere, and they achieved new progress [xin de jin zhan 2450 4104 6651 1455]. The two sides agreed to speed the talks and to hold the next round of talks in Moscow.

During the talks, Tian Zengpei, vice minister of foreign ministers, and Xiong Guangkai, assistant chief of general staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, met with the joint delegation on separate occasions.

## JAPAN

### Prime Minister Views Yeltsin's Asian Security Proposal

*OW2011030192 Tokyo KYODO in English 0250 GMT  
20 Nov 92*

[Text] Tokyo, Nov. 20 KYODO—Japanese leaders said Friday that Russian President Boris Yeltsin's proposal to establish a multinational security consultative body in Asia was too vague to evaluate, but expressed interest in learning more details.

Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa told reporters Yeltsin's proposal is "not bad, but it lacks concreteness."

In a speech to South Korea's parliament Thursday, Yeltsin suggested Asian nations should launch working-level councils to address topics such as arms reduction, and later set up a multinational body.

The Russian president also offered to reduce strategic and other weapons deployed in Asia.

Yeltsin did not specify which countries should be included in the forums.

Miyazawa in a speech last month made a similar call when he proposed that the United States and other Asia-Pacific nations consider a framework to address regional security issues. Miyazawa did not explain particulars at the time.

Chief Cabinet Secretary Koichi Kato told a regularly scheduled news conference Friday that Yeltsin's proposal indicates that Russia wants to "engage in a constructive partnership with the Asia-Pacific."

Japan plans to seek clarification of Yeltsin's proposals via diplomatic channels, Kato said.

Kato also welcomed Yeltsin's comment that Russian-Japanese relations are not stalemated, but said that he does not regard prospects for rescheduling Yeltsin's aborted visit here to have improved.

Russian sources traveling with Yeltsin said Thursday that the presidential visit may be rescheduled for early next year.

Kato said that domestic constraints that caused Yeltsin to abruptly cancel a planned mid-September visit to Japan are unchanged.

Yeltsin cited domestic difficulties when he called off the visit at the last minute.

He later suggested his decision was due to Japan's inflexibility on a long-standing territorial dispute involving four islands off Hokkaido seized by the former Soviet Union at the end of World War II.

### Russia Offers To Sell Uranium From Weapons

*OW2511143992 Tokyo KYODO in English 1416 GMT  
25 Nov 92*

[Text] Tokyo, Nov. 25 KYODO—Russia has offered to sell Japan low-grade uranium obtained from dismantled nuclear weapons for use in nuclear reactors and provide uranium enrichment services, Japanese officials said Wednesday.

But Japan was negative on the Russian overture, made in bilateral talks on nuclear energy topics that began Tuesday and are due to last through Friday, according to the Foreign Ministry officials.

The Japanese side said Japan's electric power companies have already secured their nuclear fuel needs until around 2000, the officials said.

Japan imports most of its enriched uranium from the United States.

During the talks, Russian officials said Russia could enrich uranium at a lower cost than the United States, but the Japanese replied it is more important to be assured of a stable long-term supply.

"It's difficult now to determine whether Russia can provide a stable supply of nuclear fuel in the long run," one Japanese official was quoted as telling the Russians.

On other topics, the Japanese proposed an international system to manage plutonium from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons, but their counterparts said Russia plans to store them by its own for the time being.

## REGIONAL AFFAIRS

### Visegrad Three To Set Up CFE, Open Skies Monitoring Groups

*LD2011200292 Budapest MTI in English 1823 GMT  
20 Nov 92*

[Text] Prague, November 20 (MTI)—The Visegrad Three, composed of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland should cooperate in developing the technological standards of their armies, the three countries, chiefs of staff agreed in Prague on Friday [27 November].

Concluding their two-day consultation with a joint statement, they said the three states had vested interests in meeting NATO's requirements with regard to the quality of military research, development and production.

The chiefs of staff, Karel Pezl of Czechoslovakia, Janos Deak of Hungary, and Tadeusz Wilecki of Poland, met at a military recreation centre in Merin, near Prague.

After the meeting, they told the press that in keeping with the International Treaty on the Disarmament of Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE], the three countries planned to set up joint monitoring groups. They also plan to cooperate in the framework of the "Open Skies" treaty.

## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

### Czech, Slovak States Allocate CFE Equipment Reductions

*AU1911125992 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech  
17 Nov 92 p 2*

[Report by "rk": "Small, But Our Own"]

[Text] Prague—The treaty between the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic in the sphere of defense, which was adopted by the National Governments in Zidlochovice last week, states that both republics assume the obligations arising from the Treaty on Conventional

Armed Forces [CFE]. This means, among other things, that—in three stages to be completed by 13 November 1995—the Czech Republic will reduce the strength of its Army to 93,333 men, 957 tanks, and 1,367 combat vehicles (of these, 956 will be infantry transport vehicles). There should be 230 fixed-wing aircraft, and the Czech Army will also have 50 combat helicopters at its disposal. According to the text of the treaty, the Czech Republic will assume the obligations of the CSFR relating to the activity of Czechoslovak Army soldiers in the UN peacekeeping corps.

## HUNGARY

### International Delegation Supervises Tank Destruction

*LD2411191692 Budapest MTI in English 1154 GMT  
24 Nov 92*

[Text] Budapest, November 24 (MTI)—The destruction of 510 Hungarian tanks began on Tuesday [24 November] in the Godollo machine factory, in the presence of an international military delegation.

The action is being implemented in the framework of the agreement regulating the reduction of European conventional weapons and armed forces [CFE], signed in Vienna in 1990. The agreement was concluded by representatives of 16 NATO and 5 former Warsaw Pact countries, including Hungary, and 7 former Soviet member states.

Hungary will mainly destroy some of the T34 tanks, in the interest of reducing attacking weapons. The process is taking place on the basis of strict technological regulations. The main parts of the dismantled tanks can be used as components, several tanks will be exhibited, while still others are to be purchased by foreign collectors. However, the majority of the huge steel monsters, each of which weighs 35 tons, will be melted down individually.



## INDIA

**UN Nuclear Free South Asia Resolution Opposed**

*BK1511075592 Delhi All India Radio Network  
in English 0730 GMT 15 Nov 92*

[Text] India has again made it clear its stand that nuclear disarmament is a global issue and cannot be resolved by establishing nuclear weapon-free zones. Opposing a resolution in the UN General Assembly Political and Security Committee calling for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia, the Indian ambassador, Mr. Satish Chandra, said partial measures cannot achieve the goal of complete nuclear disarmament.

Despite strong Indian opposition, the Pakistani-moved resolution was approved by the committee by 117 votes. Only India and Bhutan opposed the resolution, while 12 members abstained from voting. The resolution was co-sponsored by Bangladesh. The committee also approved a resolution on holding a conference in 1995 to review the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

**Move for Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones Criticized**

*BK1611072992 Delhi All India Radio Network  
in English 0245 GMT 16 Nov 92*

[Defense Analyst Ravindra Pal Singh Commentary]

[Text] The United Nations resolution on establishing the South Asian nuclear weapon-free zone is part of the larger United States-led strategy to contain nuclear proliferation. At the global level, nuclear-free zones are being pursued in those regions in countries having nuclear capability which have not gone overtly nuclear. For example, the regional agreement for making South America free of nuclear weapons through the instrument of the (Clocktelonko) Treaty. It has contained the nuclear capabilities of Brazil and Argentina. The nuclear weapon-free zones are not being attempted in the regions where the United States has strategic interests like the Mediterranean or West Asia nuclear-free zones which will include Israel. Conceptually, the nuclear weapon-free zone is based only on the development criteria. It does not include the criterion of either nuclear weapons deployment or their deliverability.

How can any zone be free of nuclear weapons if the major powers are allowed to deploy nuclear weapons in that region. For example, the Chinese nuclear-tipped missiles in Tibet and nuclear weapons aboard the United States ships in the Indian Ocean region. And how can South Asia be a nuclear-free zone if nuclear weapons in the arsenals of major powers can target any location in South Asia. The Pakistani proposal has its inspiration from its reactive policy to India's nuclear capability. Last year, Pakistan had proposed a five-nation conference to evolve a South Asian nonproliferation regime which aimed at containing the nuclear capacities of only Pakistan and India. As South Asian security concerns are [word indistinct] by the Chinese military potential, it is

not clear how can the South Asian nuclear-free zone develop without the Chinese renouncing their nuclear capability.

An additional concern for India is the possibility of the nuclear technology and intellectual resources being clandestinely leaked out of the erstwhile Soviet republics. The Pakistani nuclear program was developed behind a smokescreen of denials by its leaders by covertly transferring nuclear components and technologies from West European countries, Canada and the United States. A confirmation of freezing of a nuclear weapons-program is only feasible through a highly intrusive verification regime. There is no certainty that Pakistan will give up its capability which it has acquired through clandestine channels in the first place. Unless the United Nations moves toward nuclear disarmament and creates structures for intrusive verification in an equitable manner, it will become an instrument for stratification of power between the nuclear-haves and the rest of the world.

**Regional Nuclear-Free Zones Called 'Ineffective'**

*BK2211120392 Delhi All India Radio General Overseas  
Service in English 1010 GMT 22 Nov 92*

[Commentary by Darshan Singh, the president of the Small Newspaper Editors Guild: "Effectiveness of Regional Nonproliferation Regime"]

[Text] The two-day deliberations in Washington between officials of India and the United States on the issues relating to arms limitation, nonproliferation and regional security, and Bangladesh-Pakistan-sponsored resolution at the Political and Security Committee of UN General Assembly last week have once again brought out the fact that India has to concentrate and effectively tell the world at large that nuclear disarmament is a global issue and must be solved globally. The global reach of nuclear weapons and their deployment and stationing in different parts of the world make nuclear-weapon-free zone ineffective in promoting global nuclear disarmament.

The U.S. proposal to freeze either unilaterally or bilaterally with Pakistan the production of fission materials required for the manufacture of the nuclear weapons becomes almost meaningless when both the immediate neighbors of India—China and Pakistan—have nuclear devices with fully developed delivery systems. At the top of it, USA has not asked China to reduce or destroy its nuclear weapons nor has anyone tried to (?see) the reach of nuclear weapons that China has. In fact, India's security is the last concern of the USA. India has on a number of occasions insisted on a comprehensive freeze involving all the nuclear powers, as has already been agreed to by the United States and Russia. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Ronald Lehman has recently gone on record having said that United States believed that a commitment against the production of fission materials would not solve all the



proliferation problems, but it might set the stage for India and Pakistan to walk away from the nuclear abyss.

Happily, unlike talks in Delhi, this time USA has not insisted on India signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] nor did Washington press upon India the Pakistani proposal for a five-power conference on freeing South Asia of nuclear weapons. The USA, however, wanted India to sign at some stage the treaty, which is due for revision in 1995. India has no objection in signing the treaty provided it is modified to make it nondiscriminatory and global in character.

If the talks were meant to explore concrete ideas for reducing tensions and avoiding conflicts in the region, as has been put up by the U.S. [State] Department spokesman, Richard Boucher, then the USA must do something concrete to eliminate Pakistan-inspired terrorism in Punjab and Kashmir, which is an immediate security threat in South Asia. The low-intensity hostility and subconventional conflicts are fraught with various repercussions. In 1988, Rajiv Gandhi's plan could still provide a basis for further progress toward disarmament, especially when the U.S. had conceded some of its recommendations.

The resolution sponsored by Pakistan and Bangladesh and passed by the Political and Security Committee of the United Nations calling for establishment of nuclear-free zone in South Asia is having only propaganda value and is not binding to India. This resolution has been coming before the committee every year for over 16 years. Prior consultations among concerned states and their full participation are some of the essential prerequisites of any regional arrangements. Where these prerequisites are lacking, where there is an artificial definition of a region, and where no consensus exists, United Nations endorsement would not be appropriate. Pakistan and Bangladesh, before moving the resolution, had not consulted the concerned states, much less India. There was also no consensus for establishing any nuclear-weapon-free zone in the geographical regions of India's security concern. India has been generally supportive of viable, acceptable, regional disarmament efforts that took account of specific characteristics of each region. It is time for India to seriously pursue the idea of an additional treaty to remove nondiscriminatory aspects of the present NPT. It should prohibit further testing and production of nuclear weapons, fission materials, and development of new nuclear weapons by all nations of the world. It should provide for a nondiscriminatory verification system applicable to all nations on the analogy of the chemical weapons ban. It should also bring all nuclear installations, including

weapons and laboratories, under international safeguards, and there should also be a review of the treaty at the end of 20 years to check whether nuclear weapons can be banned and totally eliminated. At this stage, India must not sign NPT under any pressure.

## ISRAEL

### Disarmament Priority Said To Be Long-Range Missiles

TA2911105792 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew  
29 Nov 92 p A1

[Report by Aluf Ben]

[Text] Israel is giving top priority to disarming the Middle East of long-range missiles and puts nuclear disarmament in last place, according to the "goals of Israel's vision" on Middle East arms control drafted for the next round of multilateral talks.

The goals were formulated by a professional team in the Defense and Foreign Ministries based on the summation of the last round of talks for regional security and arms control held in Moscow in September and prior to the next session to be held in Washington in February after the change of administration there.

The wording of the goals has still not been presented for government approval, but a draft was presented last week to senior U.S. State Department officials by Defense Ministry Director General David 'Ivri when he visited Washington. 'Ivri is also head of the Israeli team to the arms control talks.

Israel's arms control goals open by recalling Isaiah's prophecy "nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more." Israel stresses its desire to live in peace and the importance of reducing armies and the arms race in the Middle East.

Israel's order of priorities in the disarming weapons of mass destruction in the region gives first priority to missiles and then to chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.

The proposal is expected to meet opposition from Egypt, which gives first priority to disarming the region from nuclear weapons and is demanding that Israel open its nuclear installations to international inspection.

Israeli sources believe that after the Clinton administration takes over the Americans will give priority to arms control in the Middle East.

## GENERAL

**Program Shows Closed Nuclear City of  
Arzamas-16**

LD2211174592

[Editorial report] Moscow Teleradiokompaniya Ostankino First Program Network in Russian at 2030 GMT on 19 November carries a 30-minute feature on the "closed city" known as Arzamas-16. The program opens with the narrator making the point that terrorists have never yet managed to steal a nuclear bomb, although such bombs have been dropped accidentally from aircraft and lost at sea. Over footage of a container said to hold a nuclear bomb, the narrator says: "Without any exaggeration, this is a nuclear bomb. Very few people know what it looks like. International agreements ban its display. So be it. It's in the interests of all of us. If the bomb is ever shown, it is only in the form of tests at proving grounds. Today the 'secret' stamp has been removed from it for the first time."

Archive film of a nuclear test is then shown. The camera shows the mushroom cloud rising into the atmosphere. The narrator continues: "What we have just seen at the testing site became so obsolete that it was scrapped long ago. Something a bit more up-to-date is being produced right here, in a town somewhat similar to the legendary (Kitizh) [video shows modern apartment blocks]. That disappeared mysteriously, but this one has emerged—no less mysteriously—to see the light of day. Quite a few hunters for military secrets tried to figure out where this town was located, in which dense forests. But with time, the town's whereabouts were computed and fed into the electronic brains of satellites. Since then these satellites have hovered day and night above the closed zone."

The narrator continues: At the security department we filmed the following daily report: [Video shows officials sitting by consoles and terminals]. The console operator says: "Three satellites were spotted by optical checks. They made [counting] one, two, three, four, five passes. The sixth pass is now taking place. It will finish in 25 minutes' time. Information on it has been passed to subunits 122 and 7. On the radio technical side, we have had one, two, three, four, five, six—12 satellites. They made a total of 12 passes. The 13th is now taking place. It will finish in 16 minutes' time. Information on [word indistinct] has been transmitted." [video shows indistinct pictures of a spherical object being lowered into a shaft]

Archive film of a nuclear test in the atmosphere is then shown. The warhead, suspended from a parachute, is seen descending. The explosion is said to take place above ground, at an altitude of 4,000 meters. By the time the blast occurred, the delivery aircraft was said to have flown on 45 km from the point where the bomb was dropped. The flash from the explosion was visible up to 1,000 km away, despite total cloud cover. Observers are seen monitoring the explosion from protective bunkers.

The narrator says that Arzamas-16 is about 70 km away from the real Arzamas. It was built on the site of the Sarov monastery, which is associated with the venerable Serafim, an Orthodox mystic and elder who lived at the beginning of the 19th century. Czar Nikolay II visited the place for Serafim's canonization in 1903. The narrator continues: "So it is that one of venerated saints of the Russian Orthodox Church has been incarcerated in an almost completely inaccessible secret zone for the last 50 years." [Video shows no-man's land between two lines of barbed wire fence surrounding white office block, then cuts to train moving through wooded landscape and shot of an elderly man talking to another man in a railway carriage.]

Promising to return to the subject of Saint Serafim, the narrator goes on: "It would take a long time to describe how one goes about applying for a permit to visit a closed zone. Well, we are now aboard a direct train service from Moscow. The scientists whom we are going to see are not listed in the encyclopaedia. You won't discover anything about them by perusing the open press. Nothing is written about them. We are travelling in a compartment of the personal carriage reserved for Academician Yuliy Borisovich Khariton. By our standards this is luxury. But when coupled with the profile of an atomic scientist it does not seem excessive. The only question is what he actually does. Academician Khariton, thrice Hero of Socialist Labor, has devoted his entire life to the theory of explosions. Though we know how the most powerful explosions are achieved, the academician is, generally speaking, a repository of state secrets. In such circumstances the right to a private railway carriage seems insignificant. Until recently he was head of the Institute of Experimental Physics, which was established on Stalin's personal orders."

These remarks are followed by an extract from "The memoirs of Y.B. Khariton" describing a conversation between Stalin, Kurchatov, and Khariton himself, in which plans to develop a nuclear weapon were discussed. Thanks to "foreign intelligence," Stalin was aware that the United States and Britain had signed a secret agreement on 19 June 1942, under which they were to cooperate in the development of an atomic bomb. Their ally, Stalin, was not supposed to be told of the agreement. Khariton is seen arriving in a town, presumably Arzamas-16, and scoffing at the suggestion that it is an old town which has merely been modernized. There was nothing here except forest before, he says. [video shows double gates and an armed sentry barring the way into railway sidings; railway passengers alighting and having their documents checked]

The narrator continues: "Half a century ago Prof. Khariton was instructed to choose a place for secret work. The people's commissar for internal affairs was fond of saying that he did not need details of any problem, just the name of the person responsible for it. After Khariton chose the site, Beria drew a small circle on a map. Then he drew another, this time a bigger one, with a radius of 500 km. He ordered his department to

make sure that nobody in the big circle was recruited for work in the small circle. It was designated as a cordon sanitaire. The old name—Sarov—disappeared from all maps. A new name—Kremlev—appeared on secret documentation. No doubt this had something to do with the importance of the work being done there. No more than eight people in the country, Stalin's most trusted lieutenants, knew about the work that was being done in the small circle."

After a brief discourse about the modest Volga car that Khariton used to drive, the narrator goes on: "If Stalin and Beria had established these scientific megapolises along the lines of the Gulag, no significant scientific achievements would have been scored. The zones were conceived as little islands of communism, where there was no shortage of food or manufactured goods. The creative return was such that it still causes amazement. The calculations for the first atomic bombs were worked out on slide rules. Calculators were only a dream at that time."

Scientists involved in the launch of the All-Union Research Institute of Experimental Physics in 1947 then speak of their experiences at the time. Prof. S.G. Kocharyants, chief designer at the institute, says he tried several times to get away from the place, appealing on one occasion directly to Khrushchev, but his applications were always turned down. Eventually he reconciled himself to his fate. He recalls with a chuckle that during his career he was awarded six or seven Orders of Lenin—he is no longer sure how many.

The narrator continues: "The concentration of scientific potential in a confined environment would justify itself if the people involved avoided intrigue and did some real work. Several score outstanding physicists managed to get along with each other inside the zone. The demanding timetable of the unrestrained arms race, on the one hand, and the taming of the cosmic forces of the atomic nucleus, on the other, swallowed up all the effort put into the program. Furthermore, the Americans' lead had to be clawed back. On the other side of the Atlantic the scientists' unseen rivals were four years ahead."

Stills of Zernov and Khariton as young men are shown. Then extracts from a conversation between Stalin, on the one hand, and Kurchatov and Khariton, on the other, in the period leading up to the first nuclear test, are quoted. The narrator says: "By the time the first Soviet atomic bomb was tested, the Americans already had 150 of them. The Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee was planning to drop them on 70 Soviet cities in the course of 30 days. The book 'The Secret History of U.S. Nuclear Research' lies on the desk of the principal designer at Arzamas-16. We have our own 12-volume work. Maybe it also lies on the desk of the man in charge at Los Alamos."

The narrator continues: "So, now we have come to the extremely delicate subject of who stole atomic secrets from whom. Reproaches and suspicions have still not been allayed. Although a film has been made about this

very subject, we will also set out our own version of what happened. At Los Alamos, where security was just as tight as at Sarov, Klaus Fuchs, a talented physicist who had emigrated from fascist Germany, handed over extremely valuable information to Soviet intelligence. Thanks to him our country was able to speed up its own program by at least two years. Let us also give due credit to other eminent American scientists who, from the very beginning of their work, insisted that atomic research had to be coordinated with the Soviet Union. Klaus Fuchs certainly did not seek material advantage by handing over information. He was convinced that a monopoly on the bomb would provoke its use. Klaus Fuchs died in the GDR shortly before the reunification of Germany."

Khariton then says: "Although, as we know, some comrades in the press, on television, claim that nobody invented anything in the Soviet Union, that Soviet scientists had everything handed to them on a plate by intelligence agents, in actual fact the work done in America and the work done here proceeded independently of each other. In the final analysis, the eventual prototype of the H-bomb, on which all modern nuclear weapons are, to all intents and purposes, based, stemmed from our own work—the Americans were the first to test this weapon in 1954, and we tested our own in 1955. But we worked completely independently on this."

An unidentified voice off camera continues: "Furthermore, we moved straight to the testing of an air drop version." [video shows a four-engined bomber taking off, then releasing a bomb suspended from a parachute; pilot and co-pilot don black goggles; the sky is illuminated by an explosion, then a shot shows a mushroom cloud beginning to form. The caption says: "This film shows the testing of a 50-megaton hydrogen bomb—it is being shown for the first time"; a later shot shows the fully-formed mushroom cloud; men in protective clothing are seen climbing aboard a tracked vehicle. The camera pans across a desolate, hilly landscape, then homes in on the entrance to what looks like a mine shaft.]

The narrator says: "At almost all stages the politicians were urging the scientists to move faster. The most up-to-date weapons gave them confidence. The physicists increased the yield of the critical mass and for the first time realized that the nuclear race threatened to plunge mankind into an abyss. This 50-megaton test, for instance, was nicknamed the political bomb. At first the Americans did not believe that our development work had reached this level of sophistication. Khrushchev could not wait to show everybody what was what. So, the scientists had no choice but to demonstrate the terrifying consequences of such tests. The atomic mushroom cloud rose to an altitude of 67 km and its radioactive fallout covered virtually the entire planet. An even more powerful warhead—one of 100 megatons—was being held in reserve. Only after this blast did the sides agree to make concessions and sign the treaty that banned testing in the atmosphere and in and under water."

Archive newsreel is then shown, with the commentary saying: "The test group is allowed to enter the restricted zone. Let's recall what the test site looked like before the explosion. Its appearance has changed greatly now. For scores of kilometers all around, the landscape has been scorched by the blast. The entrances to underground instrument bunkers have been blown in. Even the most preliminary data shows that the force of this explosion sets a record."

An interview with Professor Y.A. Romanov is then shown. The interviewer asks: "What was the point of stockpiling so many weapons?" Romanov replies: "First and foremost, I believe that our possession of these weapons saved us from major conflict during the last 50 years. After all, why do policemen carry weapons—to deal with criminals. In just the same way statesmen need weapons to deter others from attacking."

The program narrator then continues: "We have gotten used to seeing death depicted in the form of an old man with a sickle. Scientists have proved that it looks quite different [Video shows more shots of nuclear mushroom cloud]. Just see how beautiful and attractive it is in its own way. Fortunately, it has been asleep in its secret container until now. The last time it emerged was many years ago, before the signing of the nuclear test ban treaty. Might it not come to life, by some chance, if events were to take a drastic turn?"

Professor Kocharyants says: "We developed atomic bombs and automatic systems for triggering them. We also developed various types of air missiles, cruise missiles, engineering mines [an unseen speaker interposes: "All types of armaments"] We developed all types of armaments, both [word indistinct] and air defense systems. All that work was done here."

Academician A.I. Pavlovskiy then states that Russia still leads the world in a number of areas of nuclear research. Even the Americans have admitted this. Academician Y.A. Negin, dressed in military uniform, discusses the possibility of an unauthorized explosion if a bomb were to fall into the hands of terrorists. He says this could happen, but explains explains that warheads are designed in such a way as to prevent a nuclear explosion in such circumstances. A chemical explosion of limited yield is possible, but a nuclear explosion measured in kilotons or megatons would not occur. [Video shows view of large square and multi-storey buildings, general street scenes in summer; shot of armed sentries opening and closing security gates to let road traffic through, searching the trunk of a car]

The narrator says: "If you want to know what Arzamas-16 is working on now, we hasten to point out that the scientists are not sitting with their arms folded, waiting for humanitarian aid to arrive. The main subjects of research are still a state secret. But already today there are very many technologies of undoubted interest to the market. The president of Russia, who recently visited the physicists, confirmed the zone's status as a closed area,

although there is a very intensive exchange of scientists and delegations going on. One other thing—the standard of living in the closed zones is approaching that in the rest of Russia. Is this a good or a bad thing? It seems a bad thing to us. When scientists are forced to cultivate potatoes for their own consumption, it means that something is going wrong with our economic reforms, to put it mildly. Scientists are not just people, but a national asset." [Video shows A.K. Borodin of the Russian Security Ministry and Academician Y.A. Trutnev cultivating potatoes]

At the conclusion of the program Borodin talks about the need to protect intellectual property. If other people want to use the Institute's ideas, they must pay for them.

### **Belarusian Chairman Discusses Disarmament, Russian Withdrawal**

*OW2411152492 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1512 GMT 24 Nov 92*

[From "Diplomatic Panorama" prepared by correspondents Andrey Borodin, Dmitriy Voskoboynikov, and Igor Porshnev—following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] "For Belarus the problem of nuclear disarmament is the problem of removing strategic nuclear weapons, which are under Russia's jurisdiction, from our soil," the chairman of the Belarusian parliament, Stanislav Shushkevich, told newsmen. According to him, precisely this problem was discussed in Minsk on Tuesday [24 November] at a meeting with the American Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar.

According to S. Shushkevich, the withdrawal of Russian troops from Belarus should be carried out "on the basis of the experience of Russian troops' withdrawal from Germany and Poland". He said he hopes that, with the help of the USA and Europe, Belarus will be able to avoid making mistakes in this process. The main thing is "to create conditions for removing strategic forces to Russia and for accommodating servicemen in the new localities," said S. Shushkevich.

### **Belarusian Officials on Implementation on Non-Nuclear Status**

*LD2411190492 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya  
Ostankino Television First Program Network  
in Russian 1200 GMT 24 Nov 92*

[Report by correspondent A. Zhuk in Minsk, including recorded remarks by Premier V. Kebich and Supreme Soviet Chairman S. Shushkevich—from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Excerpts] The Belarus Supreme Soviet is discussing today the problem of introducing vouchers in the republic.



[Zhuk] The House of Government where the sitting of the parliament is being held has been picketed yet again. This time it is the servicemen who have gathered here. The republican Officers' Union asked them to come to the square. They are demanding that the legislative body guarantee their social protection. This includes, first and foremost, jobs—as you know the Belarusian army is undergoing major cuts—and also issues of pensions and housing.

The session is devoting much attention to a package of military issues. Some of them have already been examined but a number of draft laws on military construction are yet to be discussed. It is not only the residents of the Belarusian capital who worry about these problems, but also the republican leaders who are holding talks with U.S. senators. [passage omitted: U.S. senators satisfied that Belarus seeks to be a nuclear-free zone, promise support to Belarus in getting rid of nuclear weapons]

[Kebich] I am glad—as far as I know, the American side have understood us very well. There are no principled disagreements between us with regard to these issues.

[Zhuk] Stanislav Shushkevich also expressed his opinion after the meeting.

[Shushkevich] The question is about Belarus carrying out its initial program, so to say, and achieving the freedom from nuclear weapons which is stated in our constitution. I am under the impression that this issue can be resolved.

#### **Yeltsin, Grachev Speeches at Defense Ministry Cited**

*LD2511101192 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 25 Nov 92 pp 1, 3*

[Report by Captain First Rank Vladimir Chupakhin: "From the Enlarged Session of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry Collegium: Reforming the Army Needs a Prudent, Well-Considered Approach"—for the full text of the report on Yeltsin's and Grachev's speeches, see the Central Eurasia DAILY REPORT for 25 November 1992, pages 24-27]

[Excerpts] As already reported, an enlarged session of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry Collegium was held on 23 November in which the following took part: Boris Yeltsin, president of Russia and supreme commander in chief of the Russian Armed Forces; Ruslan Khasbulatov, chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet; Aleksandr Rutskoy, vice president of Russia; and leading officials of the Supreme Soviet and government.

Leaders of the Defense Ministry, commanders in chief of branches of forces, commanders of district troops, groups of forces, fleets, armies, and flotillas, and commanders of Army corps and squadrons attended the collegium session.

The collegium session was addressed by Russian President Boris Yeltsin. He noted that the Defense Ministry had set about the difficult task of the organizational development of the Russian Armed Forces in a quite energetic way and had within a short period of time—just six months—achieved certain results. At the same time, Yeltsin stressed, it is essential today that we analyze what has been done in an objective and exacting fashion without any glossing over of reality and hold a serious discussion about the progress of the military reform and current Army problems. [passage omitted]

The Army's role is also determined by the fact that Russia has been and remains a great world power. Such is its geopolitical position and potential. As president and supreme commander in chief I am doing and will do everything within my power to ensure that Russia has a modern army in keeping with its place in the world community. [passage omitted]

It is no secret that Russia's authority as a great power is largely based on the fact that its Armed Forces possess nuclear weapons. The Strategic Nuclear Forces form the basis of our troops' military might. It is not Ukraine, nor Kazakhstan, but Russia that possesses the nuclear button. I therefore consider it an important task, the president stressed, to ensure effective, centralized operational control over nuclear weapons. This task is not just one of Russian interest: It also embraces a major international problem, which has to be tackled via negotiations, not just with the United States but with Britain and France, too. [passage omitted]

It has to be borne in mind that, in addition to the tasks of preventing war, problems concerning disarmament and demilitarization, cutbacks in the strength of the Armed Forces, and the conversion of the defense industry loom large today. And here cutting back the Army is one of the most difficult tasks. Russia is incapable of maintaining its present force. Moreover, we do not need such a huge Army if it has a new makeup. But in cutting back the Army we need to have a clear idea of the distinctive features of its functioning and development in the new conditions. Here there are quite a few gaps at present. And it is precisely over this issue that a lot of criticism has been directed at the Defense Ministry, the president, and the government—criticism that should not be blithely dismissed. [passage omitted]

As you know, we have suspended the withdrawal of troops from the Baltic region. The Russian Foreign Ministry has been instructed to conduct all talks on troop withdrawal in the light of the priorities of providing social backup and facilities for the units and combined units being withdrawn to new places of deployment. We have issued strict demands to the Finance Ministry that it normalize the financial provision of our servicemen stationed outside Russia. [passage omitted]

For next year the military budget—in comparable prices—is planned at this year's level, despite the Army

cutback. As compared with 1992 it is intended to allocate 10 percent more resources for the purchase of equipment. But the main thing is that the social sphere's share of the budget will increase very greatly.

After the president's address Army General Pavel Grachev, defense minister of the Russian Federation, delivered a report on progress in the organizational development of the Russian Army and in the military reform. He noted the comprehensive nature of the tasks the leadership of the Armed Forces has to tackle at the present stage—these involve measures to create a Russian Army, the planned withdrawal of troops, reduction in the personnel strength of the Army, and along with this, the in-depth reformation of the Armed Forces. [passage omitted]

While noting that there are undoubtedly shortcomings and deficiencies in the ministry's activity, Grachev also drew attention to the fact that a good deal of unfair and unsubstantiated charges that military reform is marking time are at times being leveled at the ministry today. In fact the planned work is under way, the relevant documents are being drawn up, and structures are being improved. The strength of the central apparatus has been cut by 27 percent. Forty-one directorates and 140 departments (sectors) have been abolished. Troop cutbacks are proceeding according to plan. This year the strength of the Army has been cut by 180,000 men, and by the end of the year will have fallen by another 20,000. [passage omitted]

Grachev raised the question that spending on arms reduction must not be included in military spending. Provision must be made for a separate class of expenditure—disarmament expenditure.

The defense minister pointed to the need for a thoughtful, systematic approach to resolving troop withdrawal problems and emphasized that haste and the thoughtlessness of specific measures in this matter could have negative consequences and lead to social tension. There is an extreme need for a state program for the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of other states, their relocation, and the provision of facilities. A draft has been drawn up in the Defense Ministry and submitted to the government. But approval of the program has been delayed. [passage omitted]

Participating in the discussion of the problems raised at the collegium session were A. Kokoshin, Russian Federation first deputy defense minister; S. Stepashin, chairman of the Supreme Soviet Defense and Security Committee; Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces; Colonel General I. Sergeyev, Col. Gen. V. Semenov, Aviation Col. Gen. P. Deynekin, Aviation Col. Gen. V. Prudnikov, and Admiral F. Gromov, commanders in chief of the services and arms; Col. Gen. V. Ivanov, commander of the military space forces; and Col. Gen. L. Shustko, commander of the North Caucasus Military District.

## STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS

### Strategic Forces' Volkov on Unified Command, Problems

PM1911170992 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA  
PRAVDA in Russian 19 Nov 92 p 1

[Interview with Colonel General Aleksandr Volkov, first deputy commander in chief of Strategic Rocket Forces, by A. Khokhlov; place, date not given: "We Are Rocket Forces and to Us Any Target Is Close!"]

[Text] Colonel General A. Volkov, first deputy commander in chief of Strategic Rocket Forces, talks about the problems of missilemen, who have a holiday today.

[Khokhlov] Aleksandr Petrovich, in this "time of troubles" is this a holiday "with tears in the eyes?"

[Volkov] I would not have said so. Yes, missiles are being cut up for scrap and yes, a systematic troop reduction is in progress. But strategic missiles continue to remain the basis of the country's defense might. Even the reduced Strategic Rocket Forces are capable of carrying out up to 80 percent of tasks that the strategic nuclear forces are responsible for.

[Khokhlov] How much do the Rocket Forces "cost" the state?

[Volkov] A total of 6-7 percent of the defense budget goes on scientific elaborations, the procurement of equipment and maintaining it, and officers' wages.

[Khokhlov] President Yeltsin has said that our missiles are not now aimed at facilities on U.S. territory. So where are they aimed?

[Volkov] There are specific targets and there is the "zero mission." Right now it is "zero." Targets will be indicated if necessary.

[Khokhlov] How long will it take to enter specific coordinates? The flying time of alien missiles to Russian cities is 10-15 minutes...

[Volkov] There are different norms for various systems. But Russians can sleep peacefully. We will have time. Although, of course, it would be better if this never had to be done. The Strategic Rocket Forces' main task has been and remains to deter potential aggressors with the possibility of a retaliatory nuclear missile strike being made.

[Khokhlov] The Soviet Union no longer exists, the previously united country's ballistic missiles are now on alert duty in Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Has the unified command remained?

[Volkov] Yes. Operational command and control is exercised from a unified center. But a multitude of problems is arising. It is not for us but for the politicians



to solve them. I think it is time they set about implementing the decisions of the Lisbon conference, at which Russia was named the legal successor of the nuclear power called the USSR.

[Khokhlov] What if there were a war?

[Volkov] The decision to use missiles in combat will be made by agreement among the presidents of states possessing nuclear weapons. Specific measures have been taken, a decision can now be made and agreed practically instantaneously. A potential aggressor will not go unpunished.

[Khokhlov] What, in your view, are the most painful problems in the Rocket Forces?

[Volkov] Those typical throughout the Armed Forces. Human problems are at the forefront. Rocket Forces officers get the same as their colleagues in other combat arms units, plus a totally laughable bonus for performing alert duty. According to the schedule a missileman must be on duty for 92-96 periods of 24 hours per year. But because of the cadre shortfall and because many other tasks now have to be carried out, each officer is on duty for 120 days, while some are spending 14 days at the control panels.

[Khokhlov] Forgive me, but everything has been about problems and difficulties. But it is a holiday for missilemen and artillerymen. What do you wish them—as well as yourself?

[Volkov] May I answer in brief? My only wish is: Do not lose faith in the motherland.

#### **Ukrainian Officials on Outlook for START Ratification**

##### **Kravchuk Reaffirms Non-Nuclear Goal**

*LD1911234792 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1741 GMT 19 Nov 92*

[By UKRINFORM correspondent Aleksey Petrunya]

[Text] Kiev, 19 Nov (ITAR-TASS)—“We have not changed our course for achieving the status of a non-nuclear power, however, a number of problems have arisen in connection with this,” Leonid Kravchuk, president of Ukraine, stated at a meeting today with a group of journalists representing German publications. According to him, at issue is compensation for the fuel contained in the warheads of missiles deployed on the territory of Ukraine and also of guarantees for the security of his country on the part of nuclear powers.

Leonid Kravchuk stressed that the START treaty is presently being studied in the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine and will soon be presented for ratification.

Speaking of relations with Germany, Leonid Kravchuk noted that they occupy a priority place in Ukraine's political, economic, and cultural contacts. Cooperation

is also being expanded in the topical question of the resettlement of Germans to Ukraine. Contacts between Ukrainian and German firms and businessmen are also being strengthened. However, the president stressed, Ukrainian-German relations must be placed on a law-governed state basis.

##### **Expects Ratification by Jan**

*LD1911235392 Kiev Ukrayinske Telebachennya Television Network in Ukrainian 1900 GMT 19 Nov 92*

[Text] Leonid Kravchuk, president of Ukraine, today met journalists who represent the most influential mass media of Germany.

The world assesses Ukraine in the light of values which are fundamental to the west. Accordingly, questions were asked such as whether Ukraine is not lagging behind the other states of the Commonwealth on the road to the market. Leonid Kravchuk admitted to a certain lagging behind but opportunely observed that the main sign of reforms remains an increase in people's standard of living.

Germany, and with it the whole world, is worried about whether Ukraine will change its position regarding the destruction of nuclear weapons. The president did not only firmly reject this possibility; he also expressed the hope that the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet will ratify START no later than January of next year.

Leonid Kravchuk is staying in touch with the U.S. President, who understands our problems.

Leonid Kravchuk confirmed the importance our state attaches to relations with Germany.

##### **Further on Timetable**

*934P0023A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 Nov 92 p 1*

[Vladimir Skachko report: “Ukraine Does Not Need Credit but Investments: Leonid Kravchuk Has Given the Timeframe of Ratification of the START Treaty”]

[Excerpt] President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk met on 19 November with media representatives of the FRG and for the first time gave the approximate date of the Ukrainian parliament's ratification of the START Treaty on nuclear arms reduction.

According to Leonid Kravchuk, the text of the treaty is at this time being studied in the standing deputy commissions and will, possibly, be submitted for ratification this December or in January of 1993. Kravchuk declared also that Ukraine considers as an essential condition of ratification it being accorded material compensation for the missiles, assistance in dismantling them, and guarantees of its own security on the part of all the world's nuclear states. A very important step in this process, in Kravchuk's opinion, is the signing of the appropriate Ukrainian-Russian agreement. [passage omitted]

**Compensation Discussed With U.S. Senators***OW2511175592 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1651 GMT 25 Nov 92*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] A Foreign Ministry official in Kiev speaking at the end of a visit to Ukraine by U.S. Senators Sam Nunn and Ruchard Lugar spoke of understanding being reached with the U.S. on the elimination of nuclear weapons deployed in the republic. Konstyantyn Grishenko said the question of compensation for enriched uranium contained in the warheads was also discussed.

The spokesman maintained that there was a 20-year draft agreement between the U.S. and Russia under which the uranium from the warheads of long-range missiles would be sold to the American side. That is why, said Grishenko, Washington believes that the transfer of warheads to Russia would be the best option, with Kiev receiving substantial compensation for the uranium.

In the meantime, the Ukrainian deputy defence minister, Ivan Bezhan, said that Kiev was honouring its obligations under the START Treaty within the CIS framework. Speaking at an impromptu round table discussion on national radio, he denied allegations that Ukraine was creating its own codes for nuclear weapons deployed in the republic.

Bezhan spelled out support for ratifying the START Treaty, though calling for political factors to be taken into account in the reduction of nuclear weapons. In his view, the long-range missiles can be transferred outside the republic for an immediate destruction but not storage. Bezhan also believes that both the boosters and warheads must be destroyed simultaneously.

For his part, General Vladimir Strelnikov, who is in charge of the military university in Kharkov, was critical of the western position on nuclear disarmament. He said that while the western states were applying pressure on Ukraine within the framework of NATO and CSCE, they failed to do the same in respect of Britain and France whose nuclear stockpile was almost equal to that of Ukraine.

**Parliament Chairman Sure of Ratification***OW2511201092 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1921 GMT 25 Nov 92*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Ivan Plyushch, the chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, declared that he has no doubt that the republic's parliament will ratify the START treaty. At a press conference on Wednesday [25 November] in Kiev he pointed out that Ukraine's position concerning the reduction and destruction of offensive nuclear armaments remains unchanged—"it strives to become a non-nuclear power."

At the same time Plyushch said that the interests of Ukraine's national security should be observed; it is necessary to work out a mechanism of compensation for the uranium contained in the warheads.

Mentioning the resignation of the chairman of the National Bank of Ukraine, Vadim Getman, the head of the parliament noted that "as a matter of fact, it was the second bank chairman who failed to provide for a normal functioning of the financial-credit system of the country."

According to Plyushch, Getman repeatedly persuaded him and other Ukrainian leaders that going out of the ruble zone can lead to a catastrophe. "It appeared that a delay with this going out had led to a crisis," said the head of the parliament.

**Sets Conditions for Ratification***LD2711205992 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya  
Ostankino  
Television First Program Network in Russian  
1800 GMT 27 Nov 92*

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer Vykhukholev] One of the main points on the agenda of the jubilee session of the CIS heads of state in December will be the issue of which state owns the strategic nuclear weapons on the territory of the former Union republics. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine have announced their intention to become nuclear-free states; but the parliament of Ukraine, for example, is stipulating a number of conditions.

[Correspondent Vladimir Lyaskalo] I have no doubt that the Supreme Soviet will ratify the START treaty. It is not so important whether this happens in December or January. It is just that the deputies will need time to study the bulky package of documents. The important thing is how the conversion of those 176 nuclear-missile complexes now situated on our territory will be carried out. We are proposing two conditions, Plyushch said. The first is that wherever the process takes place, Ukraine must have independent and autonomous control [kontrol]. The second is that the warheads contain not only expensive metal, but also expensive fuel. We need it for our atomic stations and we are now buying it. And so we have to know, we have to have an agreement: What proportion of that fuel will be handed over to Ukraine? We'd also like to know what Ukraine can expect after the special nuclear disarmament fund has been set up. What will its share be?

**Russian Supreme Soviet's START Treaty Ratification Decree***PM2311150592 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 21 Nov 92 First Edition p 5*

["Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Decree 'On the Ratification of the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms" dated 4 November 1992 and signed by Supreme Soviet Chairman R.I. Khasbulatov]

[Text] The Russian Federation Supreme Soviet decrees:

1. To ratify the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (hereinafter called the Treaty) signed in Moscow on 31 July 1991 and including the following documents as an integral part of the Treaty:

Memorandum on the Establishment of Treaty-Related Initial Data;

Protocol on Procedures Regulating the Conversion or Elimination of Systems Subject to the Treaty;

Protocol on Treaty-Related Inspections and Continuous Surveillance Activity;

Protocol on Treaty-Related Notifications;

Protocol on the Treaty-Related Throw-Weight of Inter-continental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles;

Protocol on Treaty-Related Telemetric Information;

Protocol on a Joint Commission for Treaty-Related Surveillance and Inspections;

Protocol to the Treaty signed 23 May 1992 in Lisbon;

"Agreed Statements" annex;

"Terms and Their Definition" annex.

2. The Treaty is ratified with the following statement by the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet:

"The entry into force and implementation of the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms signed in Moscow 31 July 1991 (hereinafter called the Treaty) are accompanied by the following obligatory conditions:

"any deviation by the parties to the Treaty from the relevant legal and political commitments of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America contained in Treaty-related separate agreements, legally binding letters, politically binding statements, joint statements, and other statements on relevant questions is incompatible with the Treaty;

"the Russian Federation effects the exchange of Treaty ratification instruments following the accession of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons dated 1 July 1968 and following the conclusion by the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine of accords on the procedure for implementing the Treaty."

3. To propose that the president of the Russian Federation instruct the Government of the Russian Federation:

to elaborate a state program for the implementation of the Treaty, involving the creation [sozdaniye] and upgrading [sovershentsvovaniye] of technologies, production capacities, and the infrastructure for the elimination and recycling [utilizatsiya] of weapons and military hardware; to provide for the timely financing of all work related to the implementation of the Treaty;

to take into consideration, during the preparation of proposals on further reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms, the position expounded in the findings of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Defense and Security Committee and International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations Committee "On the Ratification of the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms."

4. The Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Defense and Security Committee, International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations Committee, Industry and Power Committee, and Ecology and the Rational Use of Natural Resources Committee are to carry out continuous verification [kontrol] of the implementation of the Treaty.

5. The Russian Federation Supreme Soviet is to hear in the first quarter of 1993 information from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense on the fulfillment of Point 3 of the present decree.

[Signed] R.I. Khasbulatov, chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet  
Moscow

House of the Soviets of Russia

[Dated] 4 November 1992

No. 3798-I

### TV Program Assesses Strategic Rocket Forces LD2211183692

[Editorial Report] Moscow Teleradiokompaniya Ostankino Television First Program Network in Russian at 0630 GMT on 22 November carries a 15-minute television documentary produced by the "Radar" studio entitled "Where are the rockets launched to?" The documentary opens with the statement that it is four decades since the first strategic ballistic missile was launched, but now common sense had prevailed and efforts were being made to reduce the numbers of strategic missiles. President Yeltsin recently proposed that the heavy SS-18 missiles be removed from combat alert and that strategic offensive armaments be reduced three-fold. This confirms Russia's intention to build its relations with the West without any nuclear pressure. [video shows rockets on transporters and rocket control rooms]

S.G.Kochemasov, chief of staff of the Strategic Rocket Forces, states in an interview: "After the disintegration of the former Soviet Union our rocket complexes found themselves located in the territory of four independent states—Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. About two-thirds of the former total of our launchers are at present situated in the territory of Russia, and one-third are deployed in the other three sovereign states. The combat management of the rocket forces was in the past implemented within a strict framework of definite General Staff plans. Today it is implemented within the framework of the Joint Staff of the CIS Armed Forces, but their combat management is still being implemented in this way. There has been no lowering in the management or quality of management of these armaments."

The narrator says that through the reduction in personnel the work-load on strategic rocket forces personnel has been increasing. They are spending some 18-20 days a month under constant stress on combat alert duty in crowded underground accommodations. [video shows interiors of rocket silos and control rooms] The process itself of ridding the world of the nuclear missile burden has not however yet become irreversible. The missiles being reduced today are by no means old ones, but nevertheless work on new projects and tests is also continuing. There is a natural public interest in how the country's defense and the missile element will develop in the future. This closed institute, for instance, is creating strategic rockets with a multi-purpose carrier rocket, which with a little more work could be used for research or commercial purposes. [video shows exterior of a building] V.N.Lagutin, captioned as general designer, says in an interview that the Moscow Thermo-technology Institute was engaged in the development of land-based mobile ballistic missile complexes which have the advantages of being mobile, undetectable, and virtually invulnerable to attack.

The film then shows the mobile rocket complex developed by the institute. The narrator says that this, one of the latest achievements of missile technology, is now being shown on television for the first time. [video shows multi-wheeled mobile rocket launcher stationary and on the move]

The narrator says that the country's missile shield has not yet weakened. However, the pace of growth in the level of technical equipment at rocket-building enterprises is down to 30 percent of what it was, and the number of skilled specialists leaving the industry has increased seven-fold. The reason for this is not only the reduction in the numbers of rockets but also financial restrictions.

In an interview, A.A. Ryazhskikh, deputy commander of Strategic Rocket Forces, points out the good value of the rocket forces, saying: "Just 6 percent of the entire military budget is spent on maintaining the rocket forces, while the rocket forces are successful in tackling up to 80 percent of their combat tasks. The cost of tackling one launch or one combat task is two times cheaper than it is

for the Americans. During the destruction of missiles by the method of launching them, 72 missiles were launched, and there was not a single mishap. That was the case in respect of SS-20s. As for the SS-25, over the last three years there has not been one mishap or deviation from the designated flight task during about 30 planned combat training launches."

The narrator says that another proud innovation for the rocket industry has been rail-mobile rocket launch systems. No other state in the world has such rail-mobile missile complexes. They have never before been shown to anyone. This train does not really differ externally from any other passenger train, and it can be continuously on combat alert duty anywhere in the country. It carries water, fuel, and food sufficient for at least a month. [video shows locomotive pulling several closed cars; interior views of cars; one car has roof drawn back and rocket raised vertically for launching]

On the subject of this rail-mobile missile complex I.P. Romanenko, chief of the testing directorate, states in an interview: "Our testing collective was directly involved in the development, creation, and testing of this mobile railway complex. Our assessment is that this complex possesses high mobility and viability and the tactical and technical features characteristic of modern missile complexes."

The narrator says that specialists are of the opinion that it will prove cheaper to make simultaneous use of the potential of the rocket industry for defense and research purposes. [video shows shots of measurement and computing centers manned by servicemen; and aerial view of the Plesetsk test site] Yu.M. Zhuravlev, chief of staff of the Plesetsk test site, speaks of the research being done. He says: "A considerable amount of separated parts have accumulated in the region where carrier-rocket separated parts fall. It amounts in all to over 16,000 tonnes. At present we are working on four main areas. First, there is a reduction in the guaranteed remnants of the stocks of carrier-rocket fuel and a reduction in the number of zones where the separated parts fall. The second area is an assessment of the ecological and hygienic situation in the drop zone. Third, there is the clear-up in the direct drop zone, and fourth, the matter of informing the local population. In 1991 about 500 tonnes of metal were taken away to temporary depots in Archangel oblast for making use of the separated parts of carrier-rockets."

The narrator goes on to say that with the changed times social tension is mounting even among the once elite forces. Several thousand officers without apartments are at present serving in the rocket forces. They have lost all hope of a normal life and all respect for their own vocation. One interviewed serviceman says that their numbers have been reduced three-fold.

The film ends with an interview with I.D. Sergeyev, commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces. He says: "A weakening of the rocket troops as the main component of the strategic forces is in my view quite impermissible

under any circumstances. The state and the people will not permit this, because after all to date there are only formulas for resolving issues by political means. Naturally, while these are still in a transitional period, while lowering the nuclear security threshold, moving toward accords with the nuclear club, and jointly lowering the general nuclear threshold, it is necessary to adhere to an adequate level of combat readiness. New forms and ways of tackling tasks are needed which in combination with the conditions that have to be resolved will in general continue to provide a high level of combat readiness and organization in our branch of the armed forces with its special features, its complicated infrastructure, and vertical and horizontal structures. In short it has to be a finely-tuned mechanism in the hands of people that must meet the requirements of professionalism and loyalty to their people, the fatherland, and the legally elected government and president."

**Kokoshin Says Nuclear Weapons To Remain Security 'Guarantor'**

*OW2311123092 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1157 GMT 23 Nov 92*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Russia's strategic nuclear forces will serve as guarantor against nuclear and conventional war for quite a while, Russia's First Deputy Defence Minister, Andrey Kokoshin, told INTERFAX. He remarked, however, that before eliminating the former union's nuclear weapons, Russia would like to have them concentrated on its territory.

Kokoshin believes that there are no serious reasons for delaying the transfer of nuclear weapons to Russia. Russia, he continued, must become the only nuclear state on the former union's territory.

**Yeltsin: Russia 'Scrupulously' Implementing START**

*LD2311193892 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
1923 GMT 23 Nov 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Gennadiy Talalayev]

[Excerpts] Moscow November 23 TASS—"Russia is scrupulously fulfilling the reached agreements on strategic arms reduction," Russian President Boris Yeltsin told U.S. Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar in the Kremlin on Monday.

"We have begun dismantling nuclear warheads, including on heavy SS-18 missiles," Yeltsin said. [passage omitted]

The guests and the Russian president also discussed nuclear forces remaining in Ukraine. The senators just returned from Kiev and said they had recommended that Ukraine observe the Lisbon agreements to become a nuclear-free state.

Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk asked the United States to act as a guarantor of Ukraine's security and provide it with economic assistance, the senators said. Yeltsin stressed "we are ready to make, jointly with the U.S., a statement on guarantees of Ukraine's security." [passage omitted]

**Kozyrev: START Valid Only After Ukraine, Kazakhstan Ratify**

*OW2311192292 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1904 GMT 23 Nov 92*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Russia will consider the treaty on reduction of strategic offensive weapons to be valid only after it is ratified by the parliaments of Ukraine and Kazakhstan, and the three republics—Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus—ratify "the Lisbon Protocol", Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev said at a meeting with the American Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar.

The talks which started in Moscow Monday focused on non-proliferation of mass destruction arms, the situation in the CIS and the international stability. Before the talks, Kozyrev stated that from Russia's point of view with the new U.S. administration of Bill Clinton "the practical cooperation between the two countries should have a much higher level".

**ICBM's To Be Used for Commercial Launches**

*LD2911175092 Moscow Russian Television Network  
in Russian 1700 GMT 29 Nov 92*

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] By 1995 Russia will start using its intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBM's] for commercial launches of various space units. The Russian Government already has given its official permission to reequip SS-18 missiles accordingly.

**SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS**

**Latvian Local Council Threatens To Cut Power to Skrunda Radar Station**

*OW2411211292 Moscow BALTFAX in English  
1928 GMT 24 Nov 92*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Kuldiga regional council decided Tuesday [24 November] to cut off the electricity to a Russian radar station in the Latvian town of Skrunda if negotiations on transferring the station to local powers are not begun in five days. As a warning measure the power has already been cut off for three days.

Chairman of the regional administration Janis Kalnins told BALTFAX that this step was taken due to the



unwillingness of the radar station's leaders to enter negotiations. He believes the station should be closed down, the locators should be disengaged to stop their harmful effect on people, and the station's remaining parts should be used in the interests of the local government.

Chief engineer of the radar station Anatoliy Borodulin told BALTFAX that he knew nothing about the decision, and he views it as an ultimatum. Until recently, he said, the radar station had no problems in their relations with the local powers.

## CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

### NATO Said Supportive of Baltic Position on Russian Withdrawal

WS2511131192 Riga LETA in English 1455 GMT  
24 Nov 92

[Text] Riga, 24 November (LETA)—Members of NATO declared their support of the Baltic states' position, concerning the question of Russian troops' withdrawal from the territory of the Baltic countries and suggested that the Russian Government should immediately negotiate with Latvia and Estonia and sign the already agreed document with Lithuania. This was informed by the Latvian Supreme Council's deputies, Indulis Berzinsh, Imants Daudishs, Mihail Stepichev, Yanis Vaivads and Edmunds Krastinsh, at the press-conference that took place on Monday [23 November].

In spite of the fact that the resolution, adopted at the annual assembly of NATO in Brussels on November 19, expresses regret and concern about the one-sided political decision of Russia to halt Russian troops' withdrawal from the Baltic states. [sentence as received] At the same time the Latvian deputies pointed out that talk in the corridors proved that western countries wouldn't conflict with Russia regarding the Baltic question, but that the four countries should reach a compromise between themselves. The main thesis is that western countries should support Mr. Yeltsin and democratic reforms in Russia. As this is more important for western countries than the restoration of justice in the Baltic States.

Nevertheless, the resolution defines the way the western countries are going to help the Baltic states and Russia to solve the question of Russian troops' withdrawal. They intend to construct 20,000 flats, but western countries are clearly aware that all their good intentions will remain useless if Russia doesn't positively react to them. It was stated at the press-conference that western politicians are worried by the fact that Russia practically did nothing in order to withdraw its troops from the Baltic states.

The main problem on the next western countries assembly's agenda will be the question of "armies and ecology" and Latvia will certainly report on this matter.

### Deputy Premier Shumeyko on Problems of Troop Withdrawal From Baltics

OW1811184892 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1826 GMT 18 Nov 92

[From "Presidential Bulletin" prepared by Andrey Pershin, Andrey Petrovskiy, and Vladimir Shishlin; edited by Boris Grishchenko—following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Excerpt] Last month President Boris signed an order suspending the withdrawal of Russian forces from the Baltic states. First Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Shumeyko was put in charge of the implementation of the order. Here is an interview Shumeyko has given INTERFAX [IF] today.

IF: What steps, do you think, are necessary to ensure the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic countries according to schedule and with the least negative effects on the servicemen? Who is in charge of restationing the forces in Russia?

SHUMEYKO: I'm planning to discuss all this today with senior Defense Ministry officials. We'll be speaking about all aspects of the troop withdrawal—military, political, economic, social, and even moral. As regards the military and political aspects, the Russian forces stationed in the Baltic states are part of the armed forces of the former Soviet Union, and their withdrawal will change the military and political situation in the world as a whole, changing the balance of power between military alliances, the location of bases, and so on. If we pull out our forces from the Baltics, NATO countries should withdraw their forces from other regions in order not to ruin the military and political parity. The economic aspect of the problem is also very serious: if we bring our forces here without first providing them with accommodation, an infrastructure, and so forth, their social and economic problems will affect their standard of combat efficiency. Then there is the property the forces have acquired for money which belonged to the Soviet Union as a whole. There are complicated customs problems too: what can be taken out of the Baltic countries, how it can be transported, and so forth. And there is a moral aspect as well: our troops are under certain psychological pressure, being called occupation forces, for instance. This also affects their combat readiness to a certain extent. As a free and sovereign state we must strengthen our ability to defend ourselves. We shall deal with all these matters at today's meeting. We shall draft a plan which we shall later submit to the Russian Security Council and the President. We shall apparently be acting on the basis of this plan jointly with the Foreign Ministry. [passage omitted]

### Baltic States Submit Resolution to UN on Troop Withdrawal

LD1911230692 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
1958 GMT 19 Nov 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Boris Sitnikov]



[Text] United Nations November 19 TASS—Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia submitted for the consideration of the 47th session of the U.N. General Assembly a draft resolution to include in the preliminary agenda of the 48th session the item on complete withdrawal of foreign armed forces from the territory of the Baltic states.

The draft resolution expresses concern that no agreements on full withdrawal of armed forces from the territories of Latvia and Estonia have yet been concluded. The draft resolution urges all the countries concerned to conclude without delay appropriate agreements to prevent a possible conflict. The agreements should envisage the schedule for prompt, orderly and complete withdrawal of foreign armed forces from the territories of Latvia and Estonia.

The draft resolution notes support for the efforts of countries, participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to ensure the withdrawal in a peaceful way as a result of negotiations of foreign armed forces stationed in the territories of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.

This item has already been put on the agenda of the current 47th session of the United Nations General Assembly.

#### **Shaposhnikov Criticizes Baltics on Troop Withdrawal**

*LD2011155792 Moscow Mayak Radio Network  
in Russian 1308 GMT 20 Nov 92*

[Text] Now let me tell you about a most important meeting that has already taken place in the Russian capital—I mean the meeting between Air Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, and Sam Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee in the U.S. Congress, and Republican Senator Richard Lugar. They discussed the problems of strategic forces and chemical and bacteriological weapons control in Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Before the meeting, Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov spoke briefly to journalists. As you know, passions are still raging over the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of the Baltic states, and here is the commander in chief's opinion. This is a recording made by our correspondent, [name indistinct].

[Begin Shaposhnikov recording] You know, we, too, would like the troops to be withdrawn, and the Baltic states also want the troops to be withdrawn, but they must be withdrawn in a civilized manner, without humiliating the honor and dignity of the troops who are on the territory of the Baltic states. They are not occupiers, they have nothing to answer to the peoples of the Baltic states for, and there is no reason for certain Baltic leaders to stir up trouble over this issue.

The Soviet Union [as heard] has withdrawn its troops from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, and Poland, and they are being withdrawn from Germany. That is very clear. And if you formulate the issue so narrowly and accompany it with insulting attacks on the Russian troops, that means you are not being friendly toward Russia, and everybody must understand that.

The United States, other NATO states, and other Western and Eastern countries must show (?restraint) over this matter. We are all in favor of a withdrawal, and it is good that everybody agrees on this point. But as for how it should be done, I think it is unnecessary for the Baltic states to appeal to the Western countries on this matter. They will also say that the troops must be withdrawn, but so does Russia. There is a good example: The Soviet Union and Germany—or Russia and Germany, as it is now—agreed on withdrawal by the end of 1994. That is a short time frame and frankly not in Russia's favor, but nevertheless a treaty is a treaty—although it wasn't Russia that made the agreement, but the Soviet leadership—and everything is going according to schedule, nobody is interfering, Germany is not appealing to anybody. Germany has not appealed to a single NATO state, including the United States to help accelerate the withdrawal—right? So why are the Baltic states appealing—do the Western states somehow understand them better than Russia? I would very much like for the Western states that are vocal in their support of the democratic processes in Russia to back those words with action. Otherwise, on the one hand they will be saying that they are for democracy and those processes, while on the other hand they are exacerbating Russia's economic problems. [end recording]

As I have already said, Marshal Shaposhnikov touched upon the problem of Russian troop withdrawal from the Baltic countries in a conversation with journalists a few minutes before his meeting with the U.S. senators in Moscow today. I can add that in opening the meeting, Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov congratulated Sam Nunn, a senator from the Democratic Party, on Bill Clinton's victory in the presidential election. The marshal commented that both U.S. democracy and U.S. citizens have gained from that victory.

#### **Reports, Comments on Russian Troop Pullout From Lithuania**

##### **Landsbergis Decries Linkage With NATO**

*OW2011210592 Moscow BALTFAX in English  
1701 GMT 20 Nov 92*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Lithuanian parliament head Vytautas Landsbergis has said that the Russians' advancement of new conditions on the eve of United Nations discussion of the withdrawal of Russian forces from the Baltic states is an attempt to justify their reluctance to reduce their military presence in the region.

In an announcement released in Vilnius, Landsbergis commented on an interview given to BALTFAX by Russian Vice Premier Vladimir Shumeyko in which he said that the withdrawal of Russian forces from the Baltics would disrupt military and political parity in the world, and therefore should require a corresponding withdrawal of NATO forces from other regions.

"If we accept such logic everywhere where there is no parity, then perhaps the introduction of foreign forces into a country without its consent could be justified," reasoned Landsbergis in his announcement. In Landsbergis's opinion, such a position "looks like recidivism into the way of thinking of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact." "Our position was, and continues to be, clear: foreign forces must be withdrawn unconditionally," emphasized Landsbergis.

The issues surrounding the withdrawal of Russian forces from Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia will be examined by the United Nations General Assembly on 25 November.

#### **Russian-Lithuanian Talks Held**

*LD2011203992 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
1842 GMT 20 Nov 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vlasdas Burbulis]

[Text] Vilnius November 20 TASS—A meeting of a delegation of the Russian plenipotentiary on Russian troops' withdrawal from the Baltic territories, headed by Major-General Sergey Petrov, with Lithuanian National Guard Minister Audrius Butkevicius was held here today at the Lithuanian National Guard Ministry.

In the words of the Russian representative, "the Russian side reaffirmed the former Soviet troops will be withdrawn from Lithuanian territory in accordance with the schedule approved by both sides".

The general noted he exchanged opinion with the Lithuanian minister on all the range of issues related to the troops withdrawal, their transit from the Kaliningrad region via republican territory, ensuring of payments in the Lithuanian currency to Russian servicemen staying in Lithuania and provision of officers, warrant officers and members of their families remaining in Lithuania with temporary housing.

Petrov said "the meeting was business-like and frank, and the sides achieved essential agreements".

Butkevicius was less optimistic. Answering at a news conference on the meeting completion to an ITAR-TASS question whether Lithuania has claims to the Russian side on the fulfilment of the troops withdrawal schedule, he said "it is not only the matter of the schedule that is being observed on the whole".

It is also the matter of the fact "Russian troops, leaving Lithuanian territory, pass over to the Lithuanian side practically devastated facilities: Everything has been robbed, barracks are in an awful state, military property

is good for nothing. All this violates the Lithuanian-Russian agreements reached in September in Moscow. These are our claims to the Russian side," stressed the minister.

#### **Russian Division Commander Offers Assurances**

*WS2411133092 Vilnius ELTA in Lithuanian  
1433 GMT 20 Nov 92*

[Text] Major General Valeriy Frolov, commander of the 107th Division, stationed in Vilnius and Ukmerge, assured an ELTA correspondent that all its units would be withdrawn from Lithuania by the New Year. The headquarters of the division are situated in the Vilnius Northern Barracks, taking up several dozens of hectares. The territory will be transferred to the Defense Ministry in good order, according to V. Frolov.

On 20 November, Major Generals V. Frolov and S. Petrov, authorized by the group commander of the Northwest Army to solve issues related to the withdrawal of the Army under Russian jurisdiction from the territory of Lithuania, met with Defense Minister Audrius Butkevicius and other ministry officials. The schedule of the withdrawal and other related problems were discussed.

Audrius Butkevicius said at a press conference that Russia was generally observing the dates of the withdrawal. However, he expressed his concern over the fact that equipment and other immovable property were being stolen and certain buildings devastated. The minister added that Russia was avoiding the transfer to Lithuania of part of the arms that belong to it as compensation for the Army property destroyed in 1940.

#### **Brazauskas Sees No Reason To Alter Timetable**

*OW2311165992 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1509 GMT 23 Nov 92*

[From "Diplomatic Panorama" prepared by correspondents R. Abdullin, Andrey Borodin, Dmitriy Voskobonikov, and Igor Porshnev—following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Following his victory in the recent parliamentary elections in Lithuania, Algirdas Brazauskas, leader of the Democratic Labor Party [DLP], said that no big changes are expected in the country's foreign policy under the new leadership. In an interview with DP [Diplomatic Panorama], he stressed that he sees no reason for altering the time of Russian troops withdrawal from Lithuania. Under the agreement reached between the Russian and Lithuanian military in September, they must leave Lithuania by next August. "The decision concerning withdrawal should be carried out," A. Brazauskas pointed out.

There should be no lack of clarity in relations between Lithuania and Russia, he said. "We must look at the situation realistically. We remain Russia's neighbours," said the leader.

When asked whether he will be able to find a common language with his colleagues in Latvia and Estonia, A. Brazauskas said: "Certainly, and perhaps to an even greater extent than previously."

In the meantime Gediminas Kirkilas, First Deputy Chairman of the Democratic Labor Party, finds it necessary to make Lithuania's foreign policy—which, in his view, was lopsided and one-sidedly oriented to the West—more balanced.

In his interview with DP, G. Kirkilas spoke in favor of stepping up Lithuania's regional policy and promoting relations with the closest neighbours: Belarus, Poland, Latvia, Estonia and the St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad regions of the Russian Federation.

The newly-elected parliament convenes for its first session in Vilnius on Wednesday [25 November]. As DP's correspondent learned from sources close to the DLP leadership, the session is expected to adopt a statement on the continuity of Lithuania's foreign policy.

#### **Landsbergis Reiterates Position**

*LD2711111092 Vilnius Radio Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 2200 GMT 25 Nov 92*

[Text] The press bureau of the Lithuanian parliament, before the beginning of the first sitting of the Seimas, published a statement by Supreme Council chairman Vytautas Landsbergis.

The document states that the withdrawal of the Russian army from Lithuania, in spite of the signed agreements and international obligations, might not be ensured if there is lack of international attention.

A statement by Russian Deputy Defense Minister Grovov, made on 23 November to the Russian newspaper IZVESTIYA is yet another example of looking for pretexts to justify nonwithdrawal. It could be interpreted also as a demand that Lithuania should allow onto its territory new contingents of Russian conscripts. It is also explained that otherwise Russia would greatly slow down the withdrawal of its units.

Lithuania's stand remains unchanged: foreign soldiers must go home. The withdrawal of the army cannot be stipulated by any demands, says the statement published this morning by Vytautas Landsbergis, who was still discharging his duties as chairman of the Supreme Council.

#### **Seym Declaration on Russian Army**

*WS2711130292 Vilnius ELTA NEWS BULLETIN in English 1851 GMT 26 Nov 92*

[“Declaration of the Seym of the Republic of Lithuania on the Removal of the Russian Army:—headline]

[Text] 26 November 1992—“Having assembled for its opening session on 25 November 1992 and basing itself upon the will of the people of Lithuania expressed in the

referendum of June 14, 1992 on the withdrawal of the Russian Army and the compensation for the damage done to Lithuania by the occupation and the annexation, the Seym of the Republic of Lithuania confirms these demands and pledges to do its best that the agreements between Lithuania and Russia, including the schedule for the withdrawal of the Russian armed forces from Lithuania, signed on 8 September 1992 in Moscow, should be carried out unconditionally.

The Seym of the Republic of Lithuania appeals to the United Nations Organization and the parliaments of democratic states asking them for support of these natural and legal demands of Lithuania“.

The declaration was adopted by unanimous vote of the members of the Seym and signed by Chairman of the Seym of the Republic of Lithuania Algirdas Brazauskas.

#### **U.S., Dutch Officers Inspect Volga Military Units**

*PM2311165992 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Nov 92 p 2*

[Oleg Bedula report under the “From Our News Bureau” rubric: “Two Groups of Foreign Specialists Have Finished Work in Volga Military District”]

[Text] The first group of U.S. officers, headed by Colonel L. Kelly, has scrupulously counted up all the hardware in a motorized rifle regiment—which took almost 48 hours, our correspondent Oleg Bedula reports. Military specialists from the Kingdom of the Netherlands led by Lieutenant Col. A. Mulders spent one day checking another motorized rifle regiment.

After noting the good preparation of the inspected facilities, both groups registered the accuracy of the information provided by the Volga Military District's department for ensuring the implementation of treaties.

#### **NATO Discussions on Troop Withdrawal From Baltics Described**

*LD2211193992 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1830 GMT 21 Nov 92*

[Text] A delegation of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia, which from 16 to 19 November participated in an annual North Atlantic session, returned today to Riga. Imants Daudiss, the head of the delegation, commented on what was achieved at the assembly.

[Begin Daudiss recording] I think that we returned from Belgium, from Bruges, with very good results. In any case we had not expected that the Baltic question would be raised to such a high level and that the Baltic voice would still sound so loudly, because two main resolutions, out of approximately 13 which were adopted at this assembly, were, first, on Yugoslavia and second on the question of Baltic security. So, this resolution was on the withdrawal of the Russian Army from the Baltics.

It should be said that before that we were working very hard in commissions. There were very many difficult discussions, particularly between the Balts and representatives of Russia. But we reached, nevertheless, a consensus, and at the end representatives of all these 27 states adopted this resolution. The main points were the following:

First, the Russian troops are to be withdrawn immediately. Second, Russia is to immediately agree with Estonia and Latvia on dates when these troops are withdrawn. It should be said that for the first time we raised this process after internationalization, as we are accustomed to call it, to a new level. Namely, after discussing, after it became more acute, [passage indistinct] talk, we prepared and adopted it in the form of a document.

What does this document mean? It means that the 16 NATO states will have to take into account this resolution already adopted at a UN session, and after that at a sitting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, which will take place on 18 December in which foreign ministers will participate.

As is known, the North Atlantic Assembly consists of the parliamentarians of the NATO member states, 16 of them, as I said, and in addition there were 11 more associated members. A unified stance now predominates in the parliaments of all these 27 states. Namely, that the troops have to be compulsorily withdrawn, that dates have to be agreed on and there is no other way.

So, this idea, this view, will go further to still other international institutions, which I mentioned. The main ones are the United Nations and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. Also Russia can no longer retreat because it took part in this session and it will stick to this position. The main thing is that now it is out of the question to either suspend this withdrawal or to not talk about it. An agreement was reached that it has to be done compulsorily, and here we have international political opinion. And I think that this is the most essential and the most important thing. So, it was a foundation for following agreements at international conferences. [end recording]

#### **Gromov Cites Figures on Troop Withdrawals, Problems**

*PM2411154592 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
24 Nov 92 Morning Edition p 3*

[Valeriy Yakov report on interview with Colonel General B. Gromov, Russian deputy defense minister; place and date not given: "Troops Are Being Withdrawn on Schedule"]

[Text] Colonel General B. Gromov, Russian deputy defense minister, cites figures to illustrate the progress of the withdrawal of Russian troops from countries close to home and further afield.

As far as countries further afield are concerned, now it can be said that our troops have been withdrawn almost entirely from Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Mongolia. All questions relating to the withdrawal of troops from Germany and Poland have finally been resolved. Moreover, all combat units have already been withdrawn from Poland, and the only people left are those preparing the installations for the handover. A total of 67 percent of the personnel and 73 percent of the hardware has been withdrawn from Germany. We still have to withdraw 6,000 people from the Western Group of Forces.

Talks are winding up and documents are being prepared for signature on the withdrawal of our training brigade from Cuba by July 1993. For the time being no firm decision has been made about the electronic tracking station that is also sited in Cuba, but the deputy minister is not ruling out the possibility that ultimately it, too, will cease to function.

Since 1989, a total of about 500,000 servicemen, 12,000 tanks, 13,000 artillery pieces, and about 3,000 aircraft and helicopters have been withdrawn from foreign states' territories.

The situation as regards countries closer to home is complicated by the political events and armed conflicts that are going on there. We are faced with withdrawing 24,000 men from the Baltic states alone in 1992. But the number of servicemen without apartments in the districts where it is planned to transfer these units varies between 2,000 and 19,000. The housing problem is therefore becoming extremely urgent and needs to be resolved without fail. A total of 1,600 apartment blocks, 580 facilities for cultural and everyday services of social life, and 2,500 storage facilities and depots need to be built before 1995.... To do all this using the resources of the Ministry of Defense alone is unrealistic.

At present the withdrawal of Army hardware from the Baltic countries is also complicated by the fact that the local authorities have banned conscripts from reinforcing the troops stationed there. But such labor-intensive work will take seven or eight years using the resources of officers alone, which obviously does not fit in with the schedules that have been adopted.

The Ministry of Defense is also worried by the future of 40,000 veterans and pensioners—former servicemen who live in the Baltic states and have recently been deprived of practically all social protection. When the troops have finally been withdrawn, their position will become even more hopeless because they will lose their last opportunity to consult military physicians and use the services of military trade outlets.

It is planned to withdraw two divisions from Georgia, the 14th Army and other Army subunits from Moldova, and the 201st Division from Tajikistan. There are practically no more Russian troops left in Armenia, some have been withdrawn, the rest have switched to the republic's jurisdiction.

In the next two years alone 398 billion rubles [R] will be needed (expressed in prices as at 1 November this year) to finance the provision of facilities for troops withdrawn onto Russian territory. And overall this complex campaign will cost the Russian state R725 billion and \$594.2 million.

#### **Russian Envoy to UN Comments on Baltic Troop Withdrawal**

*LD2511234792 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
2129 GMT 25 Nov 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Yevgeniy Menkes]

[Text] United Nations November 26 TASS—"Russian President Boris Yeltsin has repeatedly said that our country has taken a clear and unequivocal decision to withdraw former Soviet troops which it has taken under its jurisdiction from the territory of the Baltic states. We aim to complete the withdrawal as quickly as is technically possible, considering that Russia has committed itself to withdraw Soviet troops which it has taken under its jurisdiction from other foreign states," Russian Ambassador to the United Nations Yuliy Vorontsov told a plenary meeting of the 47th session of the U.N. General Assembly on the question of "full withdrawal of foreign armed forces from the territory of Baltic states" on Wednesday.

He reminded that Russia and Lithuania have agreed and signed the schedule for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Lithuania, which should be completed by August 31, 1993. The sides now have to finalize an inter-state agreement on the entire range of issues connected with the withdrawal of troops. In line with the position of Baltic states, the Russian side has offered to agree on an early withdrawal of its troops from Latvia and Estonia—by the end of 1994, if the sides agree on the withdrawal of troops and their normal functioning during the withdrawal period. Currently suspended, the withdrawal will be resumed and will be carried out quickly after the three Baltic states sign corresponding inter-state agreements.

The withdrawal of troops is not the only problem in Russia's relations with these states, Vorontsov said.

The break up of existing trade ties has worsened economic relations between these countries and Russia. Another problem, which has historic routes, is the fact that considerable numbers of Russian speakers live on the territory of Baltic states.

Unfortunately, the human rights situation as regards Russian speakers in Latvia and Estonia causes serious alarm. This question concerns two million people, many of whom were born there and have lived all their life there, have children and grandchildren who have no other motherland, but whose right to work, education, housing and so on has been left hanging in the air. Some of them fear that they will be forced out of these

countries. Some countries have already passed discriminatory laws which violate international human rights standards.

The only reasonable alternative is to forge peaceful and equal cohabitation of all nationalities in Latvia and Estonia, which requires the abolition of laws, infringing on the rights of ethnic Russians, he said. The question must be decided quickly and because of this it had been raised by the president of the Russian Federation in the United Nations.

The meeting on the basis of consensus passed a resolution, which had been submitted on behalf of three Baltic countries by Latvian Prime Minister Ivars Godmanis.

The document expressed support for "efforts by states parties to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to ensure the withdrawal of foreign forces deployed in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia without their consent, peacefully and as a result of talks".

The Assembly noted with "special satisfaction" that "the independence of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia was restored by peaceful, democratic means."

The Assembly welcomed "recent agreements on the withdrawal of foreign armed forces from Lithuanian territory", and talks on the withdrawal of armed forces from Latvia and Estonia.

#### **Latvian Officials Express Impatience on Russian Troop Withdrawal**

##### **Foreign Minister Comments**

*LD2611152292 Helsinki Suomen Yleisradio Network  
in Finnish 1400 GMT 26 Nov 92*

[Text] Latvian Prime Minister Ivars Godmanis, who is visiting Finland, has already met President Mauno Koivisto and is currently holding talks with Prime Minister Esko Aho. In an hour's time, the two prime ministers will sign a free trade agreement between Finland and Latvia.

Godmanis arrived in Finland from New York—from the UN General Assembly—where he presented a resolution, adopted last night, calling for the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic countries.

Latvian Foreign Minister Georgs Andrejevs regards the presence of Russian troops in the Baltic countries as the most important issue for these countries, both politically and financially. Speaking at a Baltic seminar organized by Yleisradio, Foreign Minister Andrejevs said that the Russian troops are still regarded among the people as occupiers.

[Begin Andrejevs recording in English] It is the most important political and even economical, perhaps, question nowadays in our state, the presence of this foreign army troops, which inside our people are called often as



occupational troops, not only foreign army troops. [sentence as heard] [end recording]

Andrejevs described the resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly last night on the withdrawal of Russian troops as an important step, although it must not be overestimated in the light of the experiences of history. Foreign Minister Andrejevs thinks that the existence of the Latvian nation is still threatened. According to him, new elections will be held in Latvia in May, at the earliest.

### **Godmanis: No Negotiations Until Pullout Resumes**

*OW2611164392 Moscow BALTFAX in English  
1603 GMT 26 Nov 92*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The UN on Wednesday [25 November] passed a resolution containing an appeal for the complete withdrawal of alien forces from Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. The document, in the name of the three Baltic States, was presented by Latvian Foreign [as received] Minister Ivars Godmanis. The UN General Secretary is bound by the resolution to keep the UN nations in regular touch about the withdrawal of troops and make a report on the latter at the next meeting of the General Assembly.

In his speech, Godmanis pointed out the contradiction between the resolution passed by Russian President Boris Yeltsin on the halting of the withdrawal of troops from the Baltic States and the Helsinki (CSCE) agreement signed in July.

Latvian Foreign Minister Georg Andrejev, who was also present in New York, told the "DIENA" newspaper that Latvia would not recommence negotiations with Russia until Boris Yeltsin changed his mind. He said that this was Godmanis' position at the talks with the UN representatives and ambassadors to the latter organisation. In the event Russia failed to carry out the UN resolution, the Baltic States had the right to appeal to the Security Council.

Regarding Godmanis' failure in his speech to lay any emphasis on Russia's efforts towards troop withdrawal in connection with minority rights in the Baltic States, Andrejev explained that the text of the speech had been prepared jointly by the representatives of all three nations. He said that the general opinion was that "it was currently undesirable to drag Russia into any debates" regarding the above matter. Andrejev admitted that the campaign launched by Lithuania in response to Russia's charges that the rights of national minorities were being violated had had very little effect so far. He said that "Latvia would make an official statement at the highest level" on this matter in December.

### **Defense Minister Grachev Discusses Force Reductions**

*OW2811150392 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1416 GMT 28 Nov 92*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The USSR Armed Forces inherited by Russia are no longer viewed as an integrated military entity for communications, combat control, and combat support systems have been disrupted. The reorganization of the Russian Armed Forces requires serious changes in the troops operational deployment and stationing.

All these issues were addressed during General Pavel Grachev's meetings with the officers of the newly incepted Urals and Volga River military districts in Yekaterinburg and Samara on Friday. Also taking part in the meetings were local administrations officials.

The Russian Army will no longer maintain strike commands giving preference to mobile rapid-deployment forces. These forces, in the words of the minister, will be based in the Urals and Volga River military districts which have been designated as operational follow-up echelon districts rather than rear echelon districts. In the meantime, the bedrock of the operational forward echelon, he went on, will be made up of the forces of the North Caucasian Military District following its reorganization. This district will be the first to adopt the principles of contractual service for the NCOs and enlisted members. At the start, the servicemen's average wages will amount to 10-12,000 rubles a month. "The North-Caucasian region is posing the greatest threat," the defense minister observed.

General Grachev approves the adoption by the troops of the corps and brigade structure, and deems it necessary to stop the practice of storing weapons and combat equipment at any bases other than central. "Our combat units will only maintain two sets of inventory and two sets of commissioned and warrant officers," General Grachev said. The primary sets will be regarded as a combat element to be assigned a combat mission in case of a threat of war, while the secondary sets will be used as a basis for shaping up successive units, the minister explained.

"All the Russian divisions operating outside Russia have the status of peacekeeping forces," the Russian defense minister noted. According to General Grachev, Russia has dispatched to the so-called "troubled areas" all of its "combat ready elements". The interior forces do not have enough strength to settle the disorders that are erupting on the territory of the former Soviet Union, General Grachev explained. In his opinion, the army has put an end to bloodshed in the areas engulfed in national conflicts, and the troops will need to remain there until the politicians reach political solutions to the confrontations under peaceful conditions.



In the words of General Grachev, the Russian troops assigned to carry our peacekeeping missions are currently composed of 1 army, 1 army corps, 4 brigades, and 10 regiments. The minister emphasized that these units will be manned strictly on the voluntary basis, their "remuneration exceeding that in other forces".

Further, the defense minister revealed that throughout 1992, the numeric strength of the Russian Armed Forces has been reduced by 180,000 people, the RF MOD [Russia Federation Ministry of Defense] central staff having been reduced by 27 percent or 5,500 persons. In his words, 130 general officers' offices have been annulled. Simultaneously, 15 divisions, 23 brigades, 36 air regiments, nearly 100,000 servicemen, 1,500 tanks, and close to a million pieces of various of military material have been withdrawn to Russia from their stations in foreign countries and new independent states. The process of withdrawal will continue until 1995, he said.

In the next 2-3 years, Russian will have to provide housing to 400,000 servicemen in the units returning back to Russia and their families. The Russian government has allocated for these purposes additionally 39.9 bn [billion] rubles which allocation, in the words of General Grachev, is insufficient.

During General Grachev's meetings in Yekaterinburg and Samara, he made a decision to direct to housing construction all the funds accrued as a result of sales and utilization by the local enterprises of the outdated army materiel and equipment. The funds raised as a result of export of the brass obtained in the process of procession of 43 mn [million] aviation bombs where were stored at the depots of the Urals Military District alone will also be used for the same purposes. The regional administration heads pledged to put up some of the officers' families at the premises of local health resorts, pioneer camps, recreation centers, etc. until their housing problems are resolved.

## CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

### Interview With Biopreparat Official

937C0102Z Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Oct 92 p 4

[Interview with Prof. Yuriy Tikhonovich Kalinin, doctor of technical sciences and chairman of the board of the state concern Biopreparat, by Vitaliy Kaysyn, under the rubric "Top Secret": "Drugs: A Defense, or a Weapon?"; first two paragraphs are source introduction]

[Text] Many legends have sprung up about the concern Biopreparat. One respected newspaper wrote this about it: It's the same "civilian" roof under which military officials in civilian clothes keep the country on the brink of a bacteriological war.

Not very long ago, according to our information, Biopreparat was actively collaborating with the Ministry of Defense, carrying out special assignments for the ministry. What are the scientists and specialists of the concern doing today? The chairman of the board of the state concern Biopreparat, Prof. Yu. Kalinin, a doctor of technical sciences, talks about that for the first time ever on the pages of a newspaper.

[Kaysyn] Yuriy Tikhonovich, what in fact is the concern Biopreparat, and what is it doing today?

[Kalinin] Our concern is a voluntary association of enterprises interacting on a cost-accounting basis. Its activity is regulated by a charter that was approved by a council of the directors of the member enterprises of the concern. The main aim of the activity of the concern, despite the many conjectures and allusions, is to meet the needs of the country's health care and people for modern diagnostic and treatment-prevention agents and medical articles. Also, to meet the needs of sectors like agriculture, the food and light industry, and machine building for biological preparations. The total volume of output is about 12 billion rubles [R] worth.

[Kaysyn] That's like your business card. But what specifically do you produce?

[Kalinin] Drugs make up most of what we produce (70 percent of the total volume of output). Not a single hospital could get by without the preparations we make. After all, antibiotics and blood substitutes are both absolutely endemic to surgeries. A large volume of the medications we produce are endocrine preparations and diagnostic systems meant for detecting infectious disease agents and for performing biochemical analyses. We try to deliver them in complete kits, with a set of reagents and laboratory ware and instruments. The enterprises of the concern manufacture nearly a thousand products.

[Kaysyn] The assortment is broad. And the volume of raw materials used by your concern is apparently immense. Today, conversations about raw materials are often accompanied by groans. Have you managed to "keep from groaning"?

[Kalinin] Well, the situation in our sector is also alarming. The disruption of cooperative ties and the rise in prices for energy carriers is also forcing us to raise our prices. And when you consider that our consumers consist of the most poorly defended strata of the population, health care agencies and the rural areas, then it becomes clear why even scarce products go unclaimed and, as a result, create a difficult financial situation for the enterprises of the concern. Our consumers owe us nearly R2.5 billion for delivered products. We, in turn, owe the suppliers of raw materials, other materials, and articles to make up kits nearly R2.0 billion. More than R1.2 billion worth of unshipped product has accumulated at the warehouses of the enterprises—primarily drugs and disposable syringes.

[Kaysyn] How are you surviving?

[Kalinin] Despite the difficulties, we still haven't allowed production to decline appreciably, and the level of production for such vitally important drugs as antibiotics is being kept at the 1990-1991 levels. Every day, it becomes harder and harder to operate, but more interesting, too. But we're surviving like this. First of all, we never became involved in administration by injunction—we've had economics-based business relationships with the staffs of the enterprises. Second, we have a solid scientific-production potential—working in the organizations of the concern are more than 1,000 highly skilled specialists (academicians, professors, doctors of science, candidates of science, and highly skilled production organizers).

[Kaysyn] Yuriy Tikhonovich, one question is always on the tip of my tongue...

[Kalinin] I know—biological weapons? I'll answer it, but in due course. That question is posed to us rather often in meetings and on the pages of the press. With scientists, things are simpler: We invite them to visit our enterprises, and after that, generally, they have only a mutual desire to collaborate. It's more difficult with journalists, who, in not going to the source, prefer to publish unverified information. Specialists are aware that in the 1960's and 1970's, our country was seriously behind in one of the most important technologies determining scientific-technical progress—biotechnology. If you consider that the first steps in genetic engineering in the West were accompanied by large-scale advertising of its "unlimited" possibilities for the economy and for health care, then the expeditious measures taken by the leadership of the country at the time become understandable. A number of decrees were adopted at that time regarding the creation of a powerful scientific-production base for basic research. I'm referring to the biological center in Pushchino-na-Oke; the Siberian departments of the Academy of Medical Sciences and the Academy of Agricultural Sciences; and the centers for the production of modern medical, veterinary, agricultural, and food preparations created with modern biotechnology techniques, particularly gene engineering. The task—to bridge the gap between the results of basic research and industrial production—was assigned to the newly created All-Union Scientific-Production Association Biopreparat. Its institutes and enterprises have always worked in close contact with the leading scientists and specialists of the country. That very cooperation among scientists and practitioners enabled the creation, in a relatively short period of time, of a material-technical base for operations involving the creation of preparations and health care needed by means of the so-called recombinant technologies.

[Kaysyn] But still, what do you do for the military?

[Kalinin] A powerful and modern scientific-production potential like ours is, understandably, also used in the interests of the defense of the country against weapons of mass destruction. In the event of war, our medical enterprises have mobilization assignments involving

drugs; systems for taking, transfusing, storing, and transporting blood; blood substitutes; disposable syringes; and other medical products. Of course, all the products must meet the most advanced requirements. Our scientists and specialists are working on that.

Moreover, in the interests of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, research is being done on biological aerosols, diagnostics, and the development of vaccine preparations—including genetically engineered preparations—for the prevention of dangerous infectious diseases of viral and bacterial etiology; technologies and equipment are being developed for their production; and instruments for specific and nonspecific indications are being designed, as are automated warning devices.

[Kaysyn] Could you say a few words about the spending for those things?

[Kalinin] They do not exceed one percent of the total budget of the concern. The activity of the NIU [not further expanded] that are part of the concern and take part in such research is regulated by the Russian government's international obligations and the corresponding legal standards.

[Kaysyn] Forgive me, I interrupted your story with my "obsessive interest."

[Kalinin] Well, I think the readers of PRAVDA will be interested to find out that as far back as in the early 1980's, the efforts of scientists and specialists of the Academy of Sciences, the Academy of Medical Sciences, and institutes of our concern resulted in the creation of the first genetically engineered interferon, which gave a cure to many oncology patients. Production of the preparation was set up at three enterprises of our concern—in Vilnius-Kaunas, Novosibirsk, and Obolensk. But more than anything else, the role of the concern showed up in the initial stages of the organization of the fight against AIDS. Many tasks associated with this complex problem were performed right in our enterprises. Within two years, we managed to eliminate the shortage of test kits, instruments, and disposable syringes. Had it not been for such potential and the financial support of the state, many millions of foreign exchange rubles would have had to have been spent on those problems for the acquisition of the proper preparations and articles via import. You can imagine what threatening dimensions AIDS might have presented for our country, had not measures been taken in a timely manner. Here's another example: Everyone knows how any natural disaster is accompanied by a rise in infectious morbidity and by epidemics. During the earthquake in Armenia, that didn't happen. And that was largely due to the fact that as soon as the Ministry of Health asked, vaccines, sera, and other needed immunobiological preparations were sent out of the mobilization reserves of the concern's enterprises to Spitak and Leninakan. And at the same time, the stocks were replenished through the round-the-clock activity of the enterprises and the existing

raw-materials reserves. Today, unfortunately, such prompt response can only be dreamed of.

**[Kaysyn]** This is the question: What about Biopreparat and the market?

**[Kalinin]** Our potential gives us not only big dividends, but also the capability of rapidly maneuvering in the reorganization of production. And that means, responding rapidly to changes in market requirements. One of the most important factors of our survival is the active participation of the concern's enterprises and institutes in virtually all national programs in health care and the economy that are funded by the government even now, in this time of such difficulties for the country's economy. Such programs include the Human Genome program, the Highly Efficient Processes for the Production of Food program, the Motherhood and Childhood program, the Diabetes program, the Control of the Most Widespread Diseases Program, the Emergency Measures to Neutralize the Effects of the Chernobyl Accident program, and the AIDS program.

**[Kaysyn]** Tell us about marketing and management as pertains to your concern.

**[Kalinin]** We are forecasting supply and demand in the sphere of activity that involves us, and we are developing programs for the development of the enterprises by conducting independent studies of them. We have just finished a big project involving the creation in Russia of the production of infusion solutions and systems for taking, transfusing, and storing blood and blood substitutes. The project has received the support of government structures. We are now beginning to implement it. Ultimately, we plan on not only meeting the needs of the country for the products, but also making a profit.

**[Kaysyn]** Are you collaborating with any Western structures?

**[Kalinin]** The concern includes about 10 joint ventures inside and outside of Russia. Foreign firms are attracted to collaboration with us by the high level of our scientific-technical achievements and by the high level of business responsibility we assume in meeting our contract obligations. Last year alone, nearly 1,000 foreign scientists and specialists visited organizations of the concern. Because the demand for products manufactured by enterprises of the concern have grown sharply. The concern prepared contracts for the delivery of, or sold, antibiotics; microbiological plant-protection agents; endocrine and genetically engineered preparations; amino acids; and biochemical reagents to the United States, England, Spain, the Korean People's Republic, Yugoslavia, Mongolia, India, and countries of Eastern Europe. We are participating in the realization of a number of projects for the country's health care sector involving foreign credit; we are also making broad use of the proposals of domestic commercial structures that are profitably investing capital in our enterprises, and in turn we are getting the opportunity to modernize our production capabilities.

**[Kaysyn]** And the last question. What are your relationships like with enterprises that are just outside our borders?

**[Kalinin]** We have managed to keep in the concern all the enterprises located in Belarus, the Baltic states, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. With the governments of Lithuania, Belarus, and Uzbekistan, the concern has signed agreements in which the enterprises of those governments maintain their membership in the concern on the basis of mutually beneficial economic and scientific-production cooperation. A similar agreement has been prepared and is under study with the government of Kazakhstan. Such documents are mutually beneficial, because they make it possible for us to produce for Russia drugs that are manufactured by enterprises in CIS countries. And Russian enterprises, in turn, are fulfilling their obligations completely in terms of deliveries for 1992 to the countries just outside our borders.

**[Kaysyn]** Thank you for the conversation.

#### **CBW Aide Quizzed on Program; Secrecy Rules Questioned**

*PM1311121392 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 11 Nov 92 First Edition p 4*

[Interview with Anatoliy Kuntsevich, chairman of the presidential Committee for Chemical and Biological Weapons Convention Problems, by Mikhail Gusev: "Unprotected State Secrets. They Must Be Kept, of Course. But on a Legal Basis"]

[Text] Two doctors of chemical sciences wrote an article about chemical weapons. A month later they were hauled off to the Russian Federation Security Ministry investigation administration, their apartments having first been searched. One was released, having been named as a witness, while the other was left in the cell, criminal action having been taken against him under the once very popular but now half-forgotten article of the Criminal Code penalizing the disclosure of state secrets.

There used to be more secrets. And the article was well used. As the younger sister of the article on high treason, it was liked because it regularly came to the aid of the Kremlin and its branches in the provinces. The article ranged far and wide. Everyone went around in its shadow. Many were directly affected.

Amid the clamor of the reform the article was forgotten. Perhaps because Russia does not have at the moment an actual law on secrecy and the protection of secrecy. But doctor of chemistry Vil Mirzayanov ended up in Lefortovo, albeit briefly, accused of "divulging information that constitutes a state secret," because the doctor is an "individual who was entrusted with this information or acquired it as part of his job." And this, "given the absence of any evidence of high treason or espionage, is punishable by two-five years' imprisonment." Unless there are serious repercussions. In which case, he could

get as many as eight. Article 75 of the RSFSR Criminal Code is severe. For 32 years it has been severe.

Those "rewarded" under the article have always had a turbulent press. They have been pilloried (sometimes hounded to the courts), as a warning to compatriots (be vigilant!). The case of Dr. Mirzayanov, who fell foul of Article 75 not during the stagnation period, but on the road to democracy, is guaranteed greater popularity than it would have had in the past.

The main antihero of the Mirzayanov-Fedorov "Poisoned Politics" in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI was Mr. X. That is what the authors call him for the sake of the story. But at the end they reveal that Mr. X is Anatoliy Kuntsevich. He is a lieutenant general and an academician. He serves as chairman of the presidential Committee on Chemical and Biological Weapons Convention Problems. The hero of the article has apparently not yet said a word. But in our pluralistic times this is frowned on.

So let us hear what Anatoliy Kuntsevich has to say about the scandal.

[Kuntsevich] This is how the story goes. An article by Mirzayanov and Fedorov was published on 17 September in the Baltimore SUN. Three days later an expanded version appeared in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI. Already there was a Baltimore SUN correspondent in my office asking for my opinion of an article I had not yet seen. I gave him an interview, but he did not ask for my evidence. And the scandal that the authors were apparently expecting did not break in the West.

A few days later I met with journalists in the United States and not one asked me about the bombshell the article's authors had allegedly detonated. In my opinion, everyone realized it was a mere bubble. And if not a provocation, then a clumsy attempt to discredit Russia by showing that it had broken its pledge not to produce chemical weapons.

Indeed, in 1987 the USSR announced that it was stopping production of chemical weapons. The stock of 40,000 tons of chemical agents that we declared at the time has not increased. Not a single carload of chemical agents has arrived at any Army dump. It will all be presented for international inspection at the prescribed time.

The statements that Russia is violating its international commitments are an attempt to discredit its leadership's political course. But Russia stands innocent before the world community.

As for developments in the sphere of offensive chemical weapons programs, no treaty since 1925 has banned them. Nor is there a taboo on scientific research and trials in this sphere. Russia has not made any unilateral commitments to that effect.

Military chemical work, like all other defense work, has special status. Each department engaged in weapons development creates certain norms to protect secrecy. Nor does democracy, even U.S. democracy, expect national assets and military, industrial, scientific, and commercial secrets to be sold off.

[Gusev] In your view, what is secret about the data published by the authors of the article in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI?

[Kuntsevich] I am no legal expert. But it is possible that merely by publicly announcing that a particular institute was working on chemical agents one is divulging a state secret. Particularly when we and the Americans have not yet exchanged data on the structure of facilities developing chemical weapons. Then an employee of the institute, having signed a pledge not to divulge the nature of his activities either during employment or after he has left, suddenly tells the whole world about it...

[Gusev] And who was the aggrieved party who applied for criminal action to be taken against the authors of the article?

[Khuntsevich] It wasn't us. In our committee's view, the activities currently performed by various departments in this sphere are not legally prohibited. So the committee does not supervise this work. It will only come under our purview once the convention banning it has been ratified and comes into effect.

[Gusev] And when will that finally happen?

[Khuntsevich] Work on it has not yet been completed, and the UN General Assembly is elaborating a resolution approving it. The initial signing is planned to take place in Paris in January, after which it will go to the states for examination and ratification. From past experience of conventions of this size, it will be an interval of some years between examination and ratification. One can expect the convention to come into effect for the bulk of the participants in approximately 1995.

[Gusev] I am clear on development. But tell me, are chemical weapons tests permitted at the moment?

[Khuntsevich] Yes. Until very recently it was even supposed that any state participating in the convention, in view of the uncertain situation in the world and by virtue of the fact that not all states would be signing it, could keep a certain quantity of chemical agents. It was proposed by France. The French also proposed that countries should be allowed to improve this so-called security stock. The Americans backed the French proposal, incidentally. It took a firm stance by Russia and other states to persuade everyone that if we are going to have a global ban it must be truly global.

But the convention is not stopping science in the sphere of physiologically active, highly toxic chemical compounds. Basic research in this area is resulting in highly effective medicines and growth stimulants. Every laboratory will be allowed to synthesize 100 kilograms of

agents with highly toxic properties annually. So the activities of an institute like the State Union Scientific Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology, which for some reason the authors describe as a "charade," will not be banned under the terms of the convention. Moreover, each country is allowed to produce one tonne of various types of chemical agents per year at one small facility. In the event of unforeseen circumstances, for the purpose of training forces, and for programs to create protection agents.

[Gusev] So were tests of binary weapons carried out, as the authors claim, in the vicinity of Nukus or not? Even if they are permitted under international norms...

[Kuntsevich] That is not a question for me either. But I do not think there could have been any tests in Nukus in 1991-1992. The Defense Ministry would be able to provide a precise answer on that one.

[Gusev] Is it true that Russia has already essentially failed to meet the deadline for starting to destroy chemical arsenals, specified by the accords with the Americans?

[Kuntsevich] They have not concluded any treaty as yet. When our president met with the U.S. President an understanding was reached: The treaty that had been drawn up between the USSR and the United States required adjustment. Russia is now reworking the program for the destruction of chemical weapons, since the old one, from the USSR era, was not approved by the Union parliament.

[Gusev] But why is the "Union" program not suitable today? There is no Union, but there is a program...

[Kuntsevich] Because we cannot afford it now in that form and on that scale. That very expensive program was a "Union" program, and it turned into a Russian program: The former brothers and sisters in arms are reluctant to cough up the money. Although, in fairness, they should. Do you know, an officer leaving Poland, the Baltic area or other places does not know where he is going to be quartered in Russia and how he is going to feed his family. But you must see that the money—something for the unemployed officer, something for disarmament—comes out of the same pocket. So our committee proposed that there be a stage-by-stage destruction of weapons rather than a large-scale program. The president agreed with us and issued a directive endorsing our approach. It was made law by a Supreme Soviet edict and government instruction.

[Gusev] But will these adjustments, which are logical from our viewpoint, be acceptable to the Americans?

[Kuntsevich] They are acceptable. We will probably start the destruction process in 1997. The Supreme Soviet will have to provide the finances for it. At stage one we plan to destroy 43 percent of the military-chemical arsenals. If the funding is reduced we will be forced to cut this percentage and thus make the destruction process even

longer. Which is also economically inadvisable: If we have to spend 20 years on this dangerous work it will simply ruin us.

[Gusev] But are we technologically prepared?

[Kuntsevich] Yes, the program now incorporates technologies that are perfectly viable. We have primary and alternative versions. We will match them to the specific site where the destruction is to take place and consult the public.

[Gusev] The big question is has it been decided where the chemical agents are to be destroyed?

[Kuntsevich] Yes. For the first stage we have designated Gornyy in Saratov Oblast and Kambarka in Udmurtia. We store large volumes of chemical agents there. It will be cheaper and safer not to transport them, but to render them harmless on the spot. We are also considering the option of arranging for the destruction of the plants that used to produce chemical weapons.

[Gusev] Who are you, Mr. X?

[Kuntsevich] I was in charge of the institute in Shikhany for 10 years and it would be ridiculous to deny that I had anything to do with the arms development program. I make no secret of it. But history will discover what kind of weapons I was involved in creating. But it is unlikely to discover everything. I do not think that in the next few years we and the Americans are going to reveal to one another all the types of work we were engaged in. This may happen in time. Archives will be opened up, documents will be declassified. Then I will write my memoirs...[Kuntsevich ends]

The lieutenant general knows, of course, whether or not tests were carried out at the test site near Nukus, where they spent many years working on biological recipes for death. He cannot, he need not know about all the military-chemical events in Russia. I have no doubt that an academician who spent his whole life as an Army scientist serving the system would have no problem deciding whether the information that has been divulged is secret. He also probably knows by heart the departmental instructions infringed by the authors. Such as the rules. Such as the formula for mustard gas.

But there was something else in Anatoliy Kuntsevich's answers that was worrying. Here it is: "Each department... creates certain norms." Let it create—that is work. But norms have to be legalized. And laws, as is known, are adopted by the supreme legislative authority. And instructions, written undertakings, and warrants must also derive from the law.

But we do not have a law on secrecy, which would simply define what a secret is. Equally, we do not have a public list of information that is secret. But there is the article of the Criminal Code for such occasions—the product of departments that are protecting their own peace and quiet rather than secrecy.



Although there is also the president's decree on the protection of secrets. Its essential purpose is to temporarily use "previously adopted normative acts on this subject." But they were adopted on all occasions and for no reason at all: In order to conceal the grim statistics of infant mortality, the horrendous level of work-related diseases, and so on.

Are we actually going to use these norms in the future?

The Supreme Soviet and the president, who, in accordance with the Constitution, is supposed to submit the draft law on state secrets to the Supreme Soviet, must speak their piece.

### Report on 1930's-Era BW Research

934P0020A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 17 Nov 92 p 6

[Article by Arkadiy Pasternak and Oleg Rubnikovich: "The Secret of Pokrovskiy Monastery: Who Began Developing Bacteriological Weapons in the USSR, and When Did They Do So?"]

[Text] The ends of many dark deeds extend into the very heart of Russia—the city of Vladimir. It is not without reason that this oblast center is renowned not only for its white-stone masterpieces of architecture. Existing nearby these cathedrals are the no-less renowned "central," the psychiatric hospital, and the political-isolation wards....

The Vladimir region yields its secrets unwillingly, and so the stories which are floating up to the surface utterly by chance seem all the more amazing and improbable. In this instance what we are talking about is the development of bacteriological weapons [BW].

We all remember the heart-rending, harrowing film shots showing how the Japanese militarists tested these weapons on living human beings. We recall the stories of the fanatical fascist doctors in the concentration camps. But could it be that our own totalitarian state at that time would respond to its enemies—real or potential—in like manner?

In an article entitled "The Danger of Bacteriological Warfare Remains" (19 September 1992) KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA reports that the development of bacteriological weapons began in our country in 1946. There is, however, a witness—the still-healthy, 76-year-old Yelizaveta Parshina—who asserts that the USSR began preparing for bacteriological warfare as long ago as the early 1930's in the then quiet, unprepossessing town of Suzdal—specifically at the Pokrovskiy Monastery.

In 1933 an affiliate of the OGPU was established here: It was the so-called BON (Special-Purpose Bureau). Test sheep and two camels wandered and grazed in the monastery's courtyard. This institution was headed up by one Faybich, a bacteriologist and physician with four

rhomboid-shaped insignia on his collar tabs. His subordinates—drawn from among a number of repressed scientists—lived in the monks' cells and did not have the right to leave the monastery territory. To be sure, their wives were permitted to visit them, and these wives did have the right to leave the cloister area. The monastery gates were tightly wrapped in a half-meter layer of thick felt which had been saturated with formalin and lysol. Standing in the Zachatyevsk Church were cages containing marmosets, guinea pigs, and jars filled with laboratory rats.

There were also other "test rabbits," located in the same indoor area where the administration of the "Pokrovskaya" Hospital now stands. Liza Parshina learned about these "others," on the day when Faybich summoned her and assigned her the duty of carrying out a special task. At that time she was working in the compound-preparations section; she was a zealous member of the Komsomol, and she was trusted.

Liza brought breakfast to a prisoner who was being kept in one of three cells located in the monastery. When the arrested man turned away for a while, she sprayed the air with a solution containing cholera bacillus from a child-size syringe. At the time of the convict's lunch she took his temperature, and it turned out to be normal. Just before dinner a professor himself—either Karpukhin or Karpunin (she does not remember his last name exactly)—used a syringe to inject a cutlet for the "test rabbit." Again she took his temperature, and again it was normal. But already by supper-time it was around 40 degrees C. The experiment had taken place. By chance Liza overheard a conversation to the effect that if the "rabbit" had survived, he would have been sent to a camp, and since he was already a "dead man," it made no difference to him; so they shot him.

After the experiment they washed Liza with various compounds and kept her in quarantine.

A certain professor—according to Yelizaveta Ivanovna's story—used to live in proud solitude: Science had become his Wife. This recluse conducted an experiment upon his own body—he inoculated himself with tetanus. The coffin containing his body was wrapped around with cotton batting which had been saturated with formalin, and then it was encased in cement. After three years had passed, they dug up this sarcophagus in order to see what had happened to the body, and they continued to perform experiments on this corpse.

What the BON was interested in—most of all—were cholera, plague, malaria, and tetanus.

When rumors began to circulate around the district about the strange inhabitants of this monastery, the bureau loaded everybody and everything onto a troop train and moved them to Kalinin Oblast, to the island of Gorodomla (on Lake Seliger), where they continued to conduct their weird and sinister experiments.



The people at the Soviet Division of the Vladimir-Suzdal Museum-Preserve think that everything set forth above should be very carefully checked and rechecked. Meanwhile, persons have been found who used to work in the BON—to be sure—in secondary roles. They are afraid to talk about this subject inasmuch as they had signed non-disclosure agreements. These persons still believe in its mythical force. Perhaps that is why they consciously assign themselves modest, secondary roles in this mysterious business.

Their testimony does not confirm certain details of Parshina's story. For example, many do not remember the camels and marmosets, nor the gates wrapped with thick felt and sawdust, thoroughly soaked in disinfectants. The grave of the professor who committed suicide by tetanus has not been found. But, indeed, why should we expect to find it if it had been exhumed and experiments performed on the corpse?

Could it be that Yelizaveta Ivanovna embellished some things? That possibility cannot be excluded. But, perhaps, other witnesses have already been "processed" or "coached" to discredit her testimony. Might that be the case?

The staff members at the Vladimir-Suzdal Monastery have definitively established that a vaccine against tularemia was developed during the wartime years at the Pokrovskiy Monastery. The possibility has not been excluded that the development of peaceful vaccines was conducted in parallel fashion with the development of lethal weapons, or that the former served as a "cover" for the latter.

Most probable of all is the thesis that it was not by chance that the BON's activity was directed by the OGPU—NKVD—MGB. What they developed there were primarily compounds to act upon individuals. Our country's history knows several instances of natural—but at the same time enigmatic—deaths.

The postwar fate of the BON is unknown. Upon the conclusion of the war a post office box was established on Gorodomla. It was that of a rocket engineer. Attempts to obtain "fresh" information from the descendants of the staff members who worked in those organs at that time have so far proved to be without results.

#### **Novocheboksarsk Plant May Switch to Destroying Chemical Arms**

*PM2311143392 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 19 Nov 92 p 2*

[Oleg Bedula report: "From Producing Chemical Weapons to Destroying Them"]

[Text] The Russian president's Committee on Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions has asked the Novocheboksarsk city administration to examine the advisability of conducting a feasibility study on converting the plant for producing chemical weapons

at the "Khimprom" science and production association into a facility for their destruction. According to a report from our correspondent Oleg Bedula, this request was discussed at a session of the city soviet's Inner Soviet, which decided to agree to conduct a feasibility study and assess the effect on the environment. It is now for an independent ecological expert assessment which will be carried out by specialists and scientists in various spheres to pass comment.

#### **St. Petersburg Institute Cleared of BW Production Charges**

##### **'No Grounds' for Allegation Found**

*LD2111193992 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
1927 GMT 21 Nov 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Nikolay Krupenik]

[Text] St. Petersburg November 21 TASS—The West's concern about the alleged violation by Russia of the 1972 convention banning biological weapons [BW] and, particularly, about the production of pure plague strain at St. Petersburg's Institute of Pure Biological Preparations have no grounds whatsoever.

This statement was made at Saturday's news conference for Russian and foreign journalists by Academician Sergey Prozorovskiy. The renowned scientists and microbiologist led the Russian part of an independent commission which investigated the work of the institute. The investigation was undertaken on the Russian president's instruction by the Committee for Conventional Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons under the Russian President between November 18-21. The commission included prominent scientists of the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences in the field of epidemiology, microbiology and virology, members of the Russian Committee for Sanitary and Epidemiological Supervision, the Committee for Conventional Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons under the Russian president.

The inspection was conducted in the presence of representatives of the Russian Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Health and Defence.

Strictly abiding by the principles of openness and trust, observers from the U.S. and Britain were invited to work on the commission.

The Institute of Pure Biological Preparations, the leading centre in this field, was set up in 1974 to deal with theoretical and applied problems of modern biotechnology and bioengineering.

The delegation received all the necessary conditions for normal work and an unimpeded access to laboratories and offices of the institute, for meetings with institute employees, for taking photos and making video films, Mark Remi, a co-chairman of the American part of the

delegation of experts and observers, told the news conference. He said the delegation was grateful to the Russian Government for the opportunity to take part in an action that would help promote trust and openness.

Head of the Russian part of the commission Academician Prozorovskiy told journalists that concern of British and American sides with regard to the activities of the Institute of Pure Biological Preparations is based, as he said, "on distorted information about research which indeed was conducted here until May 1990 with vaccines of plague strain and in 1992 with the virus of pseudo-plague of birds."

The thrust of this research was analysed with utmost attention, and it was established that the research was conducted to create vaccines and not "biological offensive strains of microorganisms, as the West mistakenly believed," Prozorovskiy stressed.

All members of the commission said the joint action was marked by businesslike and constructive atmosphere and will help promote mutual understanding and trust.

#### Experiments Said Used Only for Vaccines

LD2111234392 *Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 2200 GMT 21 Nov 92*

[Text] Russia abides by the convention banning biological weapons. Such a conclusion has been drawn by a commission of international experts who inspected the Institute for Extrapure Bio- Products in St. Petersburg. Earlier the Western press alleged that the institute was breeding plague germs. The experts saw for themselves that experiments with plague microbes were carried out exclusively to develop a highly effective vaccine to prevent against that disease not only [in] humans but also [in] domesticated animals and birds. At a news conference in St. Petersburg, a cochairman of the American part of the commission expressed gratitude to Russia's Government for the opportunity to see the institute laboratories and to take pictures.

#### Further Report

PM2411160392 *Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Nov 92 Morning Edition p 2*

[Report by Sergey Leskov: "Contrary to the Rumors, They Are Not Breeding Plague in St. Petersburg"]

[Text] A group of U.S. and British experts and a commission of leading Russian specialists set up on instructions from President B. Yeltsin have finished their work at the St. Petersburg State Scientific Research Institute of Ultra-Pure Biological Preparations.

The check was carried out as a result of claims by the Western side about the institute's laboratories allegedly producing a high-quality strain of plague, which would be a blatant violation of the 1972 convention banning biological weapons and also of the corresponding Russian presidential edict.

In the former USSR there were major institutions working on bacteriological weapons. But the State Scientific Research Institute of Ultra-Pure Biological Preparations, which comes under the Health Ministry, was "only indirectly connected in the most general way" with this sphere, P. Syutkin, deputy chairman of the Committee on Chemical and Biological Weapon Convention Problems, believes.

Nonetheless, there are rumors in the West about work in St. Petersburg with a vaccine strain of the plague microbe. The 16 experts from the United States and Britain were given complete freedom to make sound and video recordings and take photographs and they were free to visit all the institute's laboratories and premises. Unfortunately, the foreign specialists refused point-blank to offer any conclusions.

Our commission, headed by Academy of Medical Sciences Academician S. Prozorovskiy (who had never been to the institution before, incidentally) arrived at the conclusion that the institute's equipment and infrastructure were not conducive to the elaboration of offensive biological programs. As for plague, prior to 1990 the institute was working with a vaccine strain for aerosol vaccination, and prior to 1992 it was working with a preparation against pseudopest in poultry at the request of the veterinary institute of poultry breeding. The objectives of this work were carefully checked and, the commission believes, it was being done for the purpose of creating a medical vaccine and not to create offensive strains for warfare.

It is not the first time the State Scientific Research Institute of Ultra-Pure Biological Preparations has attracted public attention. Five years ago Professor V. Pasechnik, director of the institute, chose to remain in the West. In an effort to find a reason for Western experts' interest in what is by no means the most secret Russian institute in the bacteriological weapons sphere, some specialists are suggesting that V. Pasechnik provided the "tip" in order to impress people. The theory seems particularly persuasive in view of the fact that Western experts, when they inspected the institute, accidentally asked some of our employees, unerringly selecting the most gifted, whether they wanted to work in "humane conditions."

The Russian-American talks on bacteriological weapon problems are currently examining the list of institutions of mutual verification interest. As P. Syutkin said, inspections will only begin after the general criteria have been established and evaluations made. In this situation, permission to make an unscheduled visit to the St. Petersburg institute, which there has been fuss about in the West, can be seen as a goodwill gesture on the part of the Russian leadership.

### Leaders' Knowledge of CW Status Questioned

PM2011183092 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
21 Nov 92 Morning Edition p 7

[Report by Sergey Petrov, of the Contemporary Documentation Storage Center, and IZVESTIYA's Valeriy Rudnev, citing formerly secret documents signed by Gorbachev and Shevardnadze: "Presidents Do Not Know All Secrets: The Problem of the Provision of Reliable, Complete, and Accurate Information to the State's Leaders by the Military-Industrial Complex Remains Open"]

[Text] In 1987 M. Gorbachev stated: "The Soviet Union has ceased production of chemical weapons. The other Warsaw Pact countries, as is well known, never produced such weapons and did not have them on their territory. The USSR has no chemical weapons outside its own borders." At the time, we believed the USSR president.

We also believed USSR Foreign Minister E. Shevardnadze, who stated confidently at the 44th UN General Assembly session in September 1989: The USSR is prepared, together with the United States, to assume mutual commitments to stop the production of chemical weapons (including binary types), radically reduce or totally destroy chemical agents, and establish the strictest monitoring of the cessation of production and the destruction of chemical means of waging war.

And how could we not believe them—the country's president, the foreign minister... Surely they know what they are talking about. But do they? Do they not find themselves in the role of people making decisions (and very important ones!) on the basis of inaccurate information? Let us quote a secret document that has recently been released, emphasizing those points which in our view require a brief commentary.

[First document begins]

CPSU Central Committee  
Top Secret  
Special File No. P147/75

**Extract From Protocol No. 147 of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo Session of 6 February 1989**

On accusations of involvement by the Soviet Union in the proliferation of chemical weapons.

1. Concur with views set forth in Comrade E.A. Shevardnadze's memorandum of 30 January 1989 (attached).
2. The USSR KGB, USSR Defense Ministry, including military intelligence, USSR Gosplan [State Planning Committee], USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, and USSR Ministry of Chemical Industry are to submit materials on the questions raised in the memorandum to Comrade L.N. Zaykov within a month.

[Signed] Central Committee Secretary M. Gorbachev.

[Second document begins]

Appendix to Protocol No. 147, Point 75.

Top Secret.  
Special File  
CPSU Central Committee.

### On Accusations of Involvement by the Soviet Union in the Proliferation of Chemical Weapons

Over the last few years various reports on the USSR's involvement in the production, supply, and use of chemical weapons in various regions of the world have become current in the foreign press and also among the public. The majority of them contain accusations or conjectures relating to states that are allied or close to us.

Thus in April 1988 British Labour Party leader N. Kinnock raised with M.S. Gorbachev the matter of the alleged use of our chemical weapons by Ethiopian troops against the rebels.

Reports have been circulating since approximately the same period on the use of chemical weapons in Angola against UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] formations by Angolan and Cuban troops, with the implication that these weapons were of Soviet origin.

In spring 1988 there were reports in the West German press on deliveries of our chemical weapons to Iraq. During the Paris conference there were claims in the French mass media that the USSR is involved in the creation of a chemical weapons production facility in Iraq (in the region of the city of Samarra), where Soviet experts are supposedly working to this day.

In August 1988 a report began to circulate in the United States on possible cooperation between the USSR and Syria in chemical weapons production. Here the visit to Syria by V.K. Pikalov, chief of the chemical forces, was cited.

Most recently, reports have begun to be actively circulated in the United States on the DPRK's creation of a chemical warfare potential, using missiles manufactured under license from us as delivery systems. It has emerged from information from our embassy in Pyongyang that this report is not without foundation.

Lastly, the Americans have begun to connect us to the creation of a chemical weapons production facility in Libya.

It could very well be that these reports are designed as a diversionary maneuver, since, for instance, there are really serious grounds for suspecting certain FRG firms of helping to create Iraq's and Libya's chemical warfare potential. However, experience shows that the appearance of propaganda campaigns of this kind, especially if they are pursued over a long period, can be prompted by careless actions on our own part or actions by our allies and friends. (Editor's emphasis) At all events, it is no longer in doubt that in fall 1988 we helped the Libyans to organize air defense around a chemical weapons production facility which they were creating. If there is even

some element of truth in the other reports of our involvement in other countries' chemical warfare activity, then of course this seriously undermines confidence in our repeated statements, including statements at the highest level (editor's emphasis), to the effect that we have never transferred chemical weapons to anyone or sited them outside our own borders and that we oppose their proliferation. In the present situation, when, as the Paris conference clearly confirmed, the proliferation of chemical weapons could seriously complicate our efforts speedily to conclude an international convention on a complete ban on such weapons, special caution and delicacy is required of us. (Editor's emphasis)

The need therefore arises once again to see whether we are offering any grounds, however trivial, for the accusations against us. To this end the USSR KGB, the USSR Defense Ministry, including military intelligence, the USSR Gosplan, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, and the USSR Ministry of the Chemical Industry should be instructed within a month to analyze thoroughly the state of affairs on questions of the nonproliferation of chemical weapons and our actions with regard to the countries concerned. Among other things, an accurate and complete picture is needed on the following points:

- what specific chemicals and chemical equipment we have supplied to Iraq, Libya, Syria, Ethiopia, Angola, the DPRK, and Cuba, and also whether any assistance was given to these countries in the creation or operation of facilities capable of producing chemical weapons;
- what arms that could be used as means of delivering chemical weapons are supplied by us to those countries or produced by them under license from us;
- what cooperation measures in the chemical warfare defense sphere are implemented or planned by us with the said countries, and whether chemical warfare protection equipment is supplied anywhere;
- what countries have requested assistance from us on questions relating to chemical weapons and defense against such weapons, and what were our replies;
- under what programs foreign chemical forces officers are trained in the Soviet Union;
- how it came about that we helped the Libyans to create air defense for a facility destined for chemical weapons production.

The results of this analysis should be examined at Comrade L.N. Zaykov's Commission.

[Signed] E. Shevardnadze,

30 January 1989,

No. 084/OS. [document ends]

Let us draw attention to two points. First, it is striking how poorly informed the USSR's top leadership is on the state of affairs regarding the dissemination of Soviet chemical weapons abroad. They are apparently discussing this problem at the Politburo in the conditional mood and in vague terms: if it is confirmed, if this happens, it could very well be, information not without foundation, and so forth. And the list of questions to which they would like answers in order to arrive at an accurate and complete picture is really depressing. As the country's leaders, surely they, of all people, should be fully informed in advance, before dispatching chemical weapons abroad. So even presidents are not told everything!

And finally, the main factor prompting us today to return to a document that is more than three years old: **Has Russia's present leadership, in our own day, received answers to this same list of perplexed questions?** Or will we still learn about the uncontrolled actions of the military-industrial complex from abroad? There is room for doubt, in light of the case, currently being widely discussed, of Mirzayanov, who is accused of "revealing a state secret" relating to chemical weapons work (although officially no such work is in progress).

## ASIAN SECURITY ISSUES

### Yeltsin Reported Willing To Reduce Forces in Far East

SK1911103792 Seoul YONHAP in English 0955 GMT  
19 Nov 92

[Text] Seoul, Nov. 19 (YONHAP)—Russian President Boris Yeltsin disclosed the willingness Thursday to drastically reduce the Russian military forces including those deployed in the Far East area.

In an address at the National Assembly, the Russian president said, "I am willing to reduce the military forces from the viewpoint that our national interests do not conflict with but stand harmonious with the national interests of the Asia-Pacific area."

To this end, Yeltsin said, Russia has already discarded short-range missiles and ground-based tactical nuclear weapons while reducing by half the fleet of up-to-date submarines. "We will also substantially slash the battle ability of our Far East naval fleet," he said.

Stating that Russia has been exerting all efforts to help ensure genuine stability on the Korean peninsula, President Yeltsin said that "for this purpose, we have suspended military assistance to North Korea."

"Instead we will conclude a military technical cooperation agreement with South Korea, and will thus be able to furnish help to South Korea in the military technology and defense areas," he said.

Yeltsin expressed a regret over the downing of a Korean airliner, proposing to create a multilateral international

investigation team with a power to look into the papers held by all the countries involved in the incident.

On the Korean war, President Yeltsin said democratic Russia rejects the Stalin policy that had spurred the cold war system responsible for the Korean war.

He said Russia will find out all documents related to the Korean war and hand them over to President No Tae-u by the end of this year.

Vowing that Russia will not try to maintain division of the Korean peninsula to seek any military, economic and political gains, Yeltsin said Russia will become a reliable partner of South Korea in the sense that stability on the Korean peninsula is essential to ultimate stability in the Far East area.

The Russian president also asked Korean industries to advance to his country.

"We will guarantee Korean industries the most favored nation's treatment and endeavor to promote our bilateral relations by establishing a Korea-Russia goodwill association, a Korea-Russia culture and information center and a Korea-Russia language training center," he said.

Turning to inter-Korean relations, President Yeltsin said, "at this juncture when all external obstacles to unification have been crumbled, the key to unification lies totally in two Koreas."

He said that as the Russian president, he guarantees the construction of a Korean peninsula free of mass destruction weapons, expressing the hope that other world powers would join such a guarantee.

#### **Chinese-CIS Talks on Reducing Border Forces Continue**

##### **Central Asian States Join Talks**

*LD2011113892 Moscow Mayak Radio Network  
in Russian 1030 GMT 20 Nov 92*

[Text] The eighth round of talks between CIS countries and China on mutual armed forces' reductions and strengthening trust in the military sphere in the border region has ended in Beijing. Our correspondent in Beijing Vladimir Kulikov reports:

[Kulikov] Representatives of CIS states that border with China—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan—were for the first time part of the delegation conducting these talks. The delegation was headed by Nikolay Solovyev, a director of a department of Russia's Foreign Affairs Ministry.

China, Russia, and these countries are in essence conducting a unique talks process on reducing armed forces on the border. You see, until now the disarmament process was mainly about Europe or Russian-American relations.

In an interview with this correspondent, the leader of the united delegation stressed that at this round of talks great progress was achieved. Incidentally, round is probably not the best word to describe the process of strengthening trust on the border, which has been going on for several years now. It is a question of turning territory 7,500 km-long into a zone of friendship, trade, and trust.

It has already been decided that 100 km sections on both sides will gradually be turned into a zone free of any kind of offensive weapons. This will be a nuclear-free zone, a place limiting military maneuvers, and so on.

#### **Eighth Round of Talks Concludes**

*LD2811184492 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service  
in Russian 1144 GMT 28 Nov 92*

[Text] Beijing, 28 Nov (ITAR-TASS)—A joint delegation of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan, led by N. Solovyev, director of the Russian Foreign Ministry's Department of the Asian Pacific Region, and a PRC Government delegation led by Ambassador Wang Ganghua have completed the eighth round of talks on mutual cuts of armed forces and armaments in border regions and on strengthening mutual trust in the military sphere between the four CIS countries and the PRC. The sides exchanged opinions on the content of the relevant documents in a friendly and business-like atmosphere and achieved progress in the talks. The sides came to conclusion that it is necessary to speed up the talks and agreed to hold the next round in Moscow.

[Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service in Chinese at 0618 GMT on 28 November reports on the talks as follows:

["The eighth round of talks on reducing military forces in border areas and strengthening mutual trust in the military field was held in Beijing 9-27 November. Ambassador Wang Ganghua led the Chinese delegation to the talks, while Solovyev, director of the Asia-Pacific Department of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, led a joint delegation representing Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, and Tajikistan.

["According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the delegations of the two sides had an extensive [guang fan 1639 3131] and in-depth [shen ru 3234 0354] exchange of views on the content of relevant agreements in a friendly [you hao 0645 1170] and practical [qiu shi 3061 1395] atmosphere, and they achieved new progress [xin de jin zhan 2450 4104 6651 1455]. The two sides agreed to accelerate the talks and to hold the next round of talks in Moscow.

["During the talks, Tian Zengpei, vice minister of foreign ministers, and Xiong Guangkai, assistant chief of general staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, met with the joint delegation on separate occasions."]



## REPUBLIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUES

### Ukrainian 'Nuclear Umbrella' for Central Europe Urged

93UN0343A Kiev *VECHERNIY KIYEV* in Russian  
12 Nov 92 p 2

[Article by R. Koval, editor of the NESKORENA NATSIYA newspaper: "Contemporary Geopolitical Doctrines"]

[Excerpts] Substantiation of a monopolistic right to world hegemony forms the main reason for the formulation of geopolitical concepts. Pan-Mongolianism, Pan-Slavism, Eurasian views, Pan-Germanism—all of those doctrines attempted to prove the right of one race, nation, or religious community to dominate the world. Their defensive rhetoric, however, merely underscored the aggressive nature of their intentions: aggressors always attempted to conceal or justify their hegemonic aspirations before the world community. Having virtually the greatest experience in the conduct of military operations on enemy territory, Russia retains leadership in the field of "peace-loving" propaganda. The world already had the opportunity of learning about doctrines of "defense" and "unification" (naturally, around Moscow) of Slavic nations, the Orthodox, proletariat of all the nations, communist movements, "all progressive mankind," and the oppressed peoples of Africa, Asia, South and Central America. [passage omitted]

The course toward military-political alliance with totalitarian regimes of Iran, China, and Pakistan is a natural one for despotic Moscow, and it will not change when the current non-Communist opposition comes to power, furthermore, it will even expand through adjustment of good relations with S. Hussein's regime. Relations with Turkey, however, will deteriorate inasmuch as that country is a strategic ally of the U.S.A., and a traditional competitor of Iran, Pakistan, and Iraq and also has its interests in Transcaucasia and Ukraine (Crimea).

Eurasian theorists would like to create a "Eurasian quaternion": Moscow - Beijing - Tehran - Islamabad.

In Europe Moscow is counting most heavily on the support of France, known for its Russophile tendencies, which, in addition to that, also does not belong to NATO military structures.

Moscow is not abandoning hope with regard to Belarus and Ukrainian support.

It is understandable that Ukraine cannot share the interests, and consequently, the plans of Russia. But, evolving through a polemic with hostile ideas and concepts, the Ukrainian geopolitical idea may modify certain facets and present them in its own version.

### Eurasianism: Ukrainian Version

Distancing itself from Moscow and moving toward Europe, Ukraine must not forget its interests in the East. [passage omitted]

It is known that most of the countries in Europe are within the German orbit. Bonn has the greatest influence on Austria, Italy, Hungary, Croatia, and Slovenia. Consequently there are ample grounds to hope that in the not too distant future the Berlin - Vienna - Budapest - Rome - Kiev - Istanbul and, possibly, Tokyo axis might form as a counterbalance to the "Atlantic triumvirate" and the "Eurasian tetrahedron." NATO, however, which occurred in different historical circumstances, under conditions created by bipolar opposition, no longer suits the geopolitical realities with disintegration of the USSR.

A geopolitical space, successfully selected by Ukraine, will permit Kiev to effectively meet its national interests. As an ally of Europe and secular Moslem countries Ukraine will be able to successfully compete with Russia and the United States of America. Good relations with Germany, Italy, Turkey, Austria, Hungary, and Japan will ensure control of the Black Sea, Baltic Sea, and the Mediterranean as well as of Western Europe, and the Near and Far East. But such an optimistic prospect is possible only when Ukrainian leadership rejects the policy of neutrality, only when national interests attain paramount importance to them. The current leadership, however, will continue to observe political neutrality and unilateral disarmament while pretending that it does not comprehend the political significance of nuclear arguments.

Nuclear weapons are a guarantee of our independence, a guarantee of the geopolitical significance of Ukraine. Those who cannot be accepted by NATO and those who do not wish to be with Moscow: Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Croatia, the Baltic states, and in time Belarus as well, will move under our nuclear umbrella. Formation of an East European political union will raise the political significance of Kiev which will be able to cooperate with mighty Bonn on an equal footing. In the Eurasian axis mentioned above Kiev, armed with nuclear weapons, cannot play the last role. I will even stress that Italy, Hungary, Germany, and others will consider Ukrainian nuclear weapons a guarantee of high defensive capability and effectiveness of the new union.

### Need for New National Leadership

Paradoxically, however, the new foreign policy doctrine of Ukraine is being formulated by people from the old formation, people who were trained from childhood by Moscow tutors. People who could not have been suspected of Mazeppa-like behavior even a year ago. No matter what, however, they are the ones who are currently determining the foreign policy for Kiev, including the relationship of Kiev with the former mother country.



"National interests" are alien and unclear to "our" leaders. So far they are operating only with the category of their own interests. Leonid Kravchuk, for example, wants to remain in power at whatever price. If a policy of nuclear disarmament prolongs his presidency by even one year, he will continue destroying nuclear weapons on a unilateral basis. "Russophiles" understand their mission in helping Mother Russia in its difficult time. Leaders of the democratic parties as well as Rukh want the portfolios of ministers, counselors, or ambassadors. Every one of them has his own goal. How many ask themselves the question: "For what purpose does Ukraine exist in the world? What is its historical destiny?" Unfortunately most of them are concerned with the question: what is the purpose of their existence in the world and what must be done in order for their self-realization to become a perceptible phenomenon in the public life of Ukraine or some other state.

Therefore even today the policy of Ukraine is being dictated not by national interests but by the will of Moscow and Washington. Such a "policy," if it is not stopped in time may lead to a situation where the U.S.A. and Russia will include Ukraine, just like Georgia, within the sphere of its "vital interests."

I feel confident that the new generation of politicians, which will replace the bankrupt "guides" of People's Council and "the Group of 239," will be guided, first of all, by national interests. It will be specifically they who will initiate events of world significance and include other states in our geopolitical plans, and not the reverse.

From the editor: Many of our readers are interested in the position of representatives of political forces about which there are many rumors, but little of what is certain is known. Therefore we decided to publish this article, even though we do not agree with all of its points, so that Kiev residents could make up their own mind and form their opinions about contemporary Ukrainian nationalists.

#### **Article Views Plans for Transfer of Nuclear Weapons**

*PM1811160192 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 18 Nov 92 p 1*

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel Anatoliy Dokuchayev: "Strategic Forces Personnel Is Being Defined More Precisely. But Some People Would Like To Deal in Warheads"]

[Text] In December in Minsk at the meeting of the heads of the CIS states the question of the strategic forces or to be more precise the nuclear weapons of the former USSR will be among the most important again. And so the examination of a question that perturbs the world community has dragged on since the moment the CIS was created.

The joint work in which there have been ups and downs led in May to the meeting in Lisbon, where it was

determined that only one state—Russia—would be a nuclear state on the territory of the former USSR. As they say, there should be no problems in the nuclear question, but...

At a recent news conference devoted to the results of the last session of the Council of Defense Ministers, journalists from many Western mass media plied Lieutenant General Valeriy Manilov, press secretary of the commander in chief of the joint armed forces, with questions: Does the High Command have control if Kiev is suggesting to Moscow that it buy nuclear warheads like tomatoes or cucumbers?

The questions were provoked by two circumstances—the publication in the press of Ukraine's intention to obtain a good sum for the nuclear warheads and the Defense Minister Council's 4 November examination of the draft agreement on the strategic forces.

The new document concerning the strategic forces could do away with many questions. But it was not initialed by the delegation that arrived from Kiev. Nor was it signed by the Russian representatives. Although, as Lieutenant General Andrey Nikolayev, head of the Russian delegation at the Defense Ministers Council, told me in a conversation, not for reasons of principle but for purely technical reasons—"the draft is unfinished."

The absence of the signatures of the two most economically and militarily powerful CIS countries, albeit only at the preliminary stage, says a lot. But the world community and the citizens of the CIS countries are even more worried by something else—these two states' practical steps.

Having stated its readiness to withdraw the nuclear arsenal from its territory by the end of 1994, Ukraine has in practice established administrative control over this arsenal. In contravention of the agreements that have been signed the process of the taking of the Ukrainian oath has begun in the strategic nuclear forces. Understandably, in this situation it is impossible to ensure effective control either from the High Command of the CIS Joint Armed Forces or from Russia, as the only CIS state with the status of a nuclear power, over the technical state and nuclear safety of the strategic nuclear forces on Ukrainian territory.

And now there is Kiev's new step, which will hardly lead to an improvement of the situation. Now, to judge by the statement of officials in the Ukrainian Government, Ukraine would like to obtain substantial sums for the nuclear weapons which should be removed to Russia. It is a case of the RS-18 and RS-22 missiles and 1,280 warheads for them. I think that the Russian structures concerned with nuclear weapons are hardly prepared to accept such terms. There is another perturbing aspect. As we know, in addition to warheads for ground-based missile complexes, there are 600 nuclear munitions for long-range aircraft on Ukrainian territory.

What lies behind the reluctance to agree to the redeployment of 600 nuclear aircraft munitions. Does Ukraine intend to become a nuclear power? It would seem not. Ukraine's nuclear-free status was confirmed yet again by Leonid Kravchuk in a recent telephone conversation with newly elected U.S. President Bill Clinton. Nonetheless, Ukraine as of today is in practice a nuclear power—the sixth on the planet. If the ground-based nuclear forces are still controlled by the Russian strategic forces staff and the Joint Armed Forces High Command, as we can see the aircraft forces are not. The result is that Ukraine has 600 nuclear warheads and, which is also important, it has delivery vehicles—the super long-range Tu-95M and Tu-160 bombers (the latter is an aircraft of the latest modification). That is how matters really stand.

In my view Russia's role in the "nuclear issue" is also inconsistent. The decision to withdraw nuclear weapons from Ukraine to Russian territory was backed up by Kiev's commitments (the signatures of the president and other officials). But later Ukraine, interpreting in its own way many of the documents' provisions, began to haggle to obtain for itself substantial compensation for the nuclear weapons. Russia "took the bait." In particular Aleksandr Kotenkov, chief of the Russian Federation president's state-legal administration, publicly stated at a meeting of the heads of state in Bishkek that Russia plans to remove nuclear missiles from combat duty and to store their warheads on Ukrainian territory until the question of their removal to Russia for destruction has been resolved. We are offering compensation for the cost of the nuclear missiles' warheads.

Uncertainty also arises from the following point. In Bishkek the heads of state imposed the duties of commander of the strategic forces on Marshal Shaposhnikov. De jure he controls all strategic weapons. But in fact?.. I think that is why Kiev likes, not without cause, to resort at any forum to the following phrases: "Ukraine must guarantee to the world that the nuclear weapons on its territory will not be used at the will of another state."

In brief, there are many problems with the USSR's nuclear legacy. Their solution, in the opinion of experts, could involve three options.

**First option.** Suggested by the Joint Armed Forces High Command. At a scientific and practical conference devoted to problems of collective military security, Aviation Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov stated that the CIS is not a state and the nuclear weapons, as the most important component of the armed forces, must without question be owned by a state. It would be logical and natural from the viewpoint of international treaties and agreements signed in the CIS to have the command of the strategic forces in the Russian Federation—the sole heir to the USSR's nuclear status. The terms for creating this command should be ensured by Russia's treaties with the other three CIS states [where nuclear weapons are deployed]—the treaties on the status of the strategic forces, the procedure for their control, their all-around

backup, and schedule for withdrawal to Russian territory. In that case the control of the strategic forces would be exercised by the Russian Federation Defense Ministry with the direct participation of the commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces—as long as these weapons are on the territory of the four states.

**Second option.** Nuclear weapons belong to Russia and are controlled by it—without the Joint Armed Forces High Command. In that case Russia will have to introduce amendments to the treaty with Belarus on the coordination of activity in the military field and to the 20 July 1992 agreement on the strategic forces (they note that the system of control of the strategic forces temporarily deployed on Belarus' territory is a component of the system of control of the CIS Joint Armed Forces Strategic Forces). That is, today Minsk has delegated the right of control over nuclear weapons and their use to the Joint Armed Forces high command, which is under its control.

Russia has also to renounce the commitments given at the meeting of the presidents of the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan in Kokchetav.

**Third option.** If the two first options are rejected by Ukraine and Kazakhstan (Belarus, having determined the status of "its own" weapons, is not threatened with this) it will be necessary to declare the weapons their own property and all ensuing consequences under international law.

In reality the situation is developing along the first path. It is also the most acceptable, if you discount the ambitions of some politicians and their desire to use nuclear weapons as a trump card in the political and economic game.

#### **Shaposhnikov Interviewed on Joint Nuclear Forces Prospects**

*OW2011084592 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
0628 GMT 20 Nov 92*

[“Exclusive” interview with Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov by Marina Chernukha; place, date not given; from “Problems & Opinions”—following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Correspondent: How do you assess the prospects for the CIS Joint Armed Forces? What are these forces now, and what changes, do you think, should be made in them?

Shaposhnikov: The Joint Armed Forces today include, first of all, the Chief Command, second, the strategic forces, and, third, forces provided by individual CIS states for the protection of the outer borders of the CIS or for peace-keeping missions within various CIS countries.

Today we are having another period of complete uncertainty as regards the armed forces in the CIS. I think we

had the first such period when the Soviet Union fell apart but its armed forces remained. Many were hoping at that time that they would stand up to their own defense, and consequently to the defense of the Soviet Union. But, thank God, this never happened—we were able to choose another way. All CIS states now have their own armed forces. They have legislation to that effect. Of course, the armed forces haven't solved all their problems yet, but that is impossible to do within such a short time. These problems—social, legal, material, technical, strategic, and so on—have been accumulating for decades. I believe they are easier to solve by joint efforts.

Q: Could you be a bit more specific?

A: I think that now that the armed forces have been divided on the national basis it has actually become possible to unify them. This should be done on the basis of the treaty on collective security signed in Tashkent on May 15. We still haven't severed all our links because what used to bring us together was not only ideology. There were more serious reasons—cultural, economic, and finally human. I think now is the time to "gather stones." The period of sovereignty declarations is over, and every sovereign state should estimate its potential and decide whether it is able to defend itself on its own. Many can't. Now we have a chance to come back together, and, if we miss it, we may sever whatever links we still have. Such an alliance doesn't have to include all CIS states, it could include five or six. It could be based on the NATO model. We shouldn't unite to fight anyone, the purpose is to survive, which is impossible to do on one's own these days. That's the kind of future I see for our armed forces.

Q: Would each state, in that case, also have its own forces?

A: There are several options here. One of them is that each state has its own forces but detaches part of them for the Joint Armed Forces. For example, if there's a conflict on the Tajik-Afghan border, each state which has signed the collective security treaty will send some of its forces to the conflict zone. There are other options too. For example, there are many Russians and members of other nonnative nationalities serving in the forces of the states which have signed the collective security treaty, so such mixed units could be included in the Joint Armed Forces.

Q: What role will be played by the Chief Command? Will it have to be restructured?

A: I don't think so. I don't think we should have any additional structures. If there is complete mutual understanding and strict separation of functions between the Chief Command and the Defense Ministries of the CIS states, no changes will be necessary. The Chief Command has existed since July 6, the day the statute for the CIS Joint Armed Forces was signed in Moscow. Later the document was amended and approved in Bishkek. We can't be sure the way we have chosen is correct in every way but I think it is correct on the whole. There can be

some minor changes, but, in my view, our main task is to solve the strategic forces problem, and provide maximum coordination for the military policies of the CIS states. An interparliamentary assembly has been set up, and in this connection I have written a letter to Ruslan Khasbulatov asking him to have Chief Command officers included in three committees. I think all laws on defense or military reforms in the CIS states should be brought into line with each other.

Q: You have mentioned the strategic forces problem. What progress has been made on it?

A: According to all the agreements that have been signed Russia alone has the right to possess the strategic forces of the former Soviet Union. Belarus and Kazakhstan have practically no objections to this but Ukraine, as we know, has its own position. It seems to me that it would be the best provisional solution to appoint the commander-in-chief of the Russian strategic missile forces my deputy. Such appointments have already been given to the commanders-in-chief of the Air Force, the air defense forces, and the Navy. Then there will be complete coordination. For example, if the Ukrainian Defense Minister doesn't mind if the Chief Command of the CIS Joint Armed Forces controls the maintenance and, consequently, the safety of the nuclear weapons stationed in Ukraine, my deputy could go there and solve all these problems with Morozov, the Ukrainian defense minister. That would be in the interest of both Russia and Ukraine, and of the entire CIS, for that matter. Ukraine today has no adequate technical facilities for servicing the nuclear weapons stationed on its territory. Neither do we. This can only be handled by Russia. But since Russia is responsible for all strategic nuclear forces, including those stationed in Ukraine, it should naturally be aware of what is going on.

Q: Leonid Kravchuk recently said that the strategic armaments stationed on Ukrainian territory can only be transferred to Russia if Ukraine is paid compensation for the expenditures this will involve. What do you think of it?

A: I see the logic of the Ukrainian leadership. Ukraine has strategic nuclear weapons stationed on its territory but it has declared its intention to become a nuclear-free state. As you know, we offered to remove the warheads, disintegrate Ukraine from the combat control system, and modify flight instructions. But, in that case, the Ukrainian leaders believe, the nuclear weapons will cease to be nuclear weapons and will automatically become Ukrainian property. But this contradicts the international agreements on nuclear weapons signed by Ukraine as well.

Q: What, do you think, is going to happen now?

A: That is difficult to predict. I hope, though, that the present leaders have enough political wisdom and determination to find a constructive solution.

Q: Boris Yeltsin in his letter to Bill Clinton proposed cutting down nuclear armaments by two thirds or three quarters. Would that not weaken our defense capability?

A: I don't think so. I think it's a correct principle that both sides should reduce their armaments by equal amounts. If that principle is observed, which I'm sure it will, Russia and the rest of the Commonwealth will be perfectly secure.

Q: Dzhokhar Dudayev recently said he can get hold of any kind of weapons if he likes, including nuclear ones. Is that true?

A: No, that is totally impossible.

Q: What results, do you think, will the Minsk meeting have?

A: I hope the CIS charter is signed there. That, in my opinion, will be the main result of the meeting. It seems to me this will be the main subject at the meeting too.

### **CIS Command Checks Strategic Forces Outside Russia**

*LD2111105892 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1910 GMT 20 Nov 92*

[Text] This week, the high command of the CIS unified Armed Forces has been conducting a check of the units of the strategic forces deployed on the territory of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Twenty percent of the strategic nuclear arms of the former Soviet Union are concentrated in these three countries. More from our military affairs observer:

In principle, checks are routine in military training and in the guidance of troops. The level of combat readiness of units is assessed on a five-point scale by special inspection groups that go from the headquarters to the troops on a regular basis once a year. This is the first time that the high command of the CIS unified forces that controls the strategic forces is holding its check. According to words from the high command, the check concerns progress in training personnel and the daily routine of the personnel. A key issue is nuclear safety and guarding and defending the strategic forces' installations.

High command inspectors and specialists unanimously rule out the possibility of any incidents with nuclear arms on the territory of the former Soviet Union. Life has proved so far that they have been correct, but when nuclear arms are involved there can be no excessive guarantees.

However, the significance of this check goes beyond the framework of professional military matters and also beyond political and military considerations. The idea is to finally arrange and to effect interaction between the strategic forces which are so far scattered over different countries of the CIS and to reinforce the single command. That in turn will make it possible to organize better and to prepare better technically for implementing

the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, START. The parties to the treaty now, besides the United States and Russia, are also Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. The process of its ratification is nearing completion, and the START treaty will go into effect in the not-so-distant future.

Besides that, work directing the troops will help to finally coordinate the units that constitute the strategic forces themselves. These should be, tentatively, units of strategic missile troops, sea- and air-based nuclear forces, the corresponding units of antiaircraft defense, intelligence, and the technical services ensuring nuclear safety.

### **Azeri Foreign Minister Denies CBS Report on Nuclear Weapons**

*NC2011194992 Baku AZERINFORM in Azeri 1522 GMT 20 Nov 92*

[Text] Baku, 20 Nov (AZERINFORM)—Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Tofik Gasymov has categorically denied a CBS Television report on the presence of nuclear weapons on the territory of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan has allegedly threatened to use these weapons against Armenia in connection with the "bloody conflict in mountainous Karabakh."

Describing this report as a total lie, the foreign minister stated officially that no nuclear weapons exist on the territory of Azerbaijan and the nuclear tipped rockets belonging to the former Soviet Armed Forces were taken out of Azerbaijan in 1989.

The minister also noted that Azerbaijan has joined the international nuclear nonproliferation treaty and has proposed to include the republic in a nonnuclear zone.

### **Kazakh Defense Minister on Military Doctrine**

*LD2311185392 Alma-Ata KAZTAG in Russian 0000 GMT 23 Nov 92*

[Article by Colonel General Sagadat Nurmagambetov, defense minister, and Colonel Kim Serikbayev, candidate of military sciences: "The Armed Forces of Kazakhstan: Problems and Prospects"—for the full text of Nurmagambetov's article, see the Central Eurasia DAILY REPORT for 25 November 1992, pages 56-61]

[Excerpts] About eight months have passed since the presidential decree on establishing the republic's own armed forces was issued. That is not a long time, but already certain results can be summed up. There is a need for this, brought about, on the one hand, by the principle of democratizing administration in the military sphere and, on the other, by the need to respond to the numerous publications in the newspapers which raise military issues. The aim of this article is to acquaint a broad range of readers with the work that has been done, to briefly outline military doctrine and military organization, and to describe the main problems of and prospects for setting up the republic's own armed forces.

## I

[passage omitted] The advantage of the collective method of ensuring security, as history has shown, is so obvious to all that it is superfluous to cite the numerous arguments in its defense. [passage omitted]

One thing is clear—in independently implementing defense development it is essential to be guided by the interests of our own security and the defense interests of the friendly states which signed the collective security treaty. While creating a qualitatively new army and understanding the unity of the military strategic area, it is necessary at the same time to retain and develop those positive factors which were inherent in the armed forces of the former Soviet Union. In a word, Kazakhstan's own security must be founded on the collective security of its friends and on the experience of the past.

In this regard President Nursultan Nazarbayev stressed at a recent meeting of the Security Council: "We are a sovereign, independent state, and ensuring security must be a cornerstone in the overall structure of developing internal and foreign policy. We therefore need an army that is modern, equipped with the most modern weaponry, possessing high mobility, well trained, and prepared for action under any conditions in the interests of defending our sovereignty. And such an army can be created, having a fundamental scientific foundation based on historical experience and contemporary views on military development."

## II

The military doctrine of our republic is an integral part of the state blueprint for its national security and is a system of views on preventing war, military development, preparing the republic and its armed forces for repulsing possible aggression, and also on methods of conducting an armed struggle in defense of the fatherland. It stems from a need for new approaches to issues of war and peace and of ensuring the state's defense capacity while taking due account of the mutual security interests of all states. [passage omitted]

Analysis of the addresses by the republic's leader and of documents adopted by the Supreme Soviet, president, and government make it possible to draw the conclusion that the republic recognizes the preservation of peace as a priority aim and the supreme common human value, and favors all states of the world community pledging not to be the first to use military force.

In connection with this, our republic's military doctrine reflects several principled positions. In particular, that Kazakhstan will never under any circumstances be first to start military operations against any state. If Kazakhstan itself or its allies do not become the object of armed aggression, it will never be first to use nuclear or any other mass destruction weaponry. Our republic threatens nobody and is ready together with all states to build relations on the basis of mutual consideration of security interests and non-aspiration toward military

supremacy; it sees the reduction of nuclear and conventional arms as a task of historic significance. Kazakhstan recognizes that each state and nation has an equal right to take part in resolving all issues of international life and is opposed to the policy of force and the arms race.

Taking account of the fact that the republic sets as the main aim of its international activity assisting any peace-making efforts by the world community, the military doctrine determines pressing tasks in the field of preventing war. The main ones are: ending the arms race on Earth and preventing it from spreading in space; a total ban on nuclear tests; eliminating chemical and other types of weapons of mass destruction; participating in negotiations on cutting and reducing to a minimum opposing groupings of armed forces in zones where they are concentrated; developing contacts through military channels and implementing on a mutual basis confidence-building measures in Europe and also in other regions of the world; and finally, transforming military-political alliances into new structures of a collective and comprehensive system of international security.

A legitimate question arises: Do there exist at the present stage any real grounds for the outbreak of military conflicts? Unfortunately, it has to be said that while there exist territorial, economic, religious, ethnic, and other contradictions, there remains the danger of the outbreak of armed conflicts which could in the course of escalation grow into full-scale wars. Among the sources of potential danger one could count the possession by a number of states of powerful groupings of armed forces which are based in close proximity to the borders of our republic; instability in the military and political situation in neighboring regions; and the increase by certain states of their military potential, including weapons of mass destruction. [passage omitted]

On the basis of the prevailing international situation and economic conditions it is expedient to form small armed forces which are kitted out with modern equipment and weaponry.

In the course of building our armed forces and organizing their units and formations several interrelated practical tasks must be resolved at the same time: several formations and units of the former union army must be disbanded and thus there must be a reduction in the overall number of the armed forces; the composition and status of Commonwealth strategic forces must be defined; interaction with the Main Commissariat of the CIS Combined Armed Forces must be organized; certain reforms must be carried out in all branches of our armed forces and, lastly, there must be a considerable reduction both in the number of military test sites and in the area set aside for them. [passage omitted]

We shall now dwell in somewhat greater detail on the problems and prospects of test sites. What is to be done with them? First, it is proposed that the number of major test sites should be significantly reduced; second, there should be a reduction in the area of land allocated for



these test sites which cannot be closed right now; and third, these test sites should be used only for military purposes by agreement with heads of administrations and where such use does not prevent national economic tasks from being carried out.

Four major test sites have been closed and have ceased to function on the territory of Kazakhstan to date. The issue of closing a fifth one has been raised. At the remaining test sites the area has been reduced on average by 50 percent and, in accordance with the Law on Use of Land, a tax is being levied from the military department for the use of the land.

At first sight it appears that the time has come and there is a need to close all military test sites. However, it must be taken into consideration that the interests of ensuring military security still compel the republic to retain a certain number of military test sites and to ensure that they operate according to agreed mutually advantageous conditions. Highly skilled specialists work at some of them. They have advanced technology and equipment. The families of service personnel live there and quite a number of representatives of the local population work at them. They have set up a good infrastructure and help improve the social, cultural and everyday lives of the population. Therefore provision is being made to continue to make joint use of certain test sites to resolve national economic tasks and in the interests of developing science and new technology and increasing the numbers of scientific cadres for the republic.

The fate of the former Semipalatinsk nuclear test site provides graphic evidence of this. A national nuclear center has been set up on the basis of it. The use of its scientific potential to resolve exclusively peaceful tasks and improve the ecology of the region is now being studied. [passage omitted]

#### Defense Ministers Council Official on CIS Military Cooperation

PM2511160592 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 24 Nov 92 p 2

[Interview with Lieutenant General Leonid Ivashov, secretary of Council of Commonwealth Countries' Defense Ministers, by Anatoliy Dokuchayev; place, date not given: "Considerably More Unites Us Than Divides Us"—first paragraph is introduction. For the full text of Ivashov's interview, see the Central Eurasia DAILY REPORT for 27 November 1992, pp 2-4.]

[Excerpts] The anniversary of the formation of the CIS is approaching. Our military observer met with Lieutenant General Leonid Ivashov, secretary of the Council of Commonwealth Countries' Defense Ministers, and asked him to speak about certain results of, and prospects for, cooperation in the defense sphere.

"It is impossible to make an unequivocal assessment of the results of one year's cooperation in the defense sphere," Leonid Grigoryevich said. "For a year an active

search was made for new forms of work, and also—this is probably the chief thing—efforts were made by the CIS High Command and by the committees set up and by the defense ministries of the Commonwealth states to preserve the combat ability of the Armed Forces of what is now the former Soviet Union. [passage omitted]

The third stage of military building within the CIS framework began in May, after Russia also announced the creation of its own Armed Forces. Its characteristic feature is the acquisition by the troops (naval forces) of their own state allegiance.

[Dokuchayev] Apart from the Strategic Forces?

[Ivashov] Yes, the situation with the Strategic Forces remains tangled to this day. Their status and composition were defined by the corresponding agreements—of 30 December 1991 and 14 February 1992. But, having signed the document, not all sought conscientiously to fulfill it. Unilateral changes were made to the accords reached earlier.

[Dokuchayev] What is of greatest concern to the High Command today in "strategic matters"?

[Ivashov] Not only the High Command but even the NATO Command and the U.S. leadership are concerned at this question: To whom, to which state, does the mightiest nuclear monster [makhina] belong, and who is answerable for its operation, management, and nuclear security? For a force capable of destroying mankind lies within its belly. If even an insignificant nuclear incident were to occur today, the guilty persons could not be found. Of course, such a situation is inadmissible.

[Dokuchayev] What is the way out of such a situation?

[Ivashov] Options for resolving the problem of the Strategic Nuclear Forces have been discussed repeatedly at the level of heads of state, defense ministers, and specialists-experts. A political consensus has not been reached, although definite progress has been made. The most realistic option is the one whereby all the Strategic Forces are transferred to Russia's jurisdiction, and it is also entrusted with responsibility for all the nuclear weapons of the former USSR. Naturally, with the consistent dismantling and destruction of the nuclear means now located outside Russia. In this case Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine have the right to exercise control [kontrol] over the nuclear means sited on their territory. If any of the aforesaid states does not accept this option, it will have to declare the nuclear weapons its own property with all the ensuing international legal consequences. [passage omitted]

[Dokuchayev] Many experts believe today that global threats are becoming obsolete...

[Ivashov] I would not be in a hurry to draw such conclusions. The existence of strong combat-ready armies is a reality. Mountains of arms, including nuclear arms, have been accumulated in the world. This alone poses a threat not only to the CIS states but also to all



mankind. Despite the process of reducing nuclear weapons and their delivery system, they are constantly being improved. It would evidently be premature to rule out entirely the possibility of a confrontation between nuclear powers or groups of states. In short, potential threats on a global scale have not been eliminated. It would not be sensible to disregard them. [passage omitted]

The concept of such a coalition military doctrine must be built on the principles of ensuring mutual restraint, internal stability, and the political steadiness of the Commonwealth and the world community as a whole.

The realization of the military-technical aspect of the doctrine can provide for the separation of functions and tasks among the states' armed forces in the interests of ensuring its own security and the security of partners in the coalition. In this case the systems that are common to all states will preserve their capability—the missile attack early warning systems, air defenses, military space, military intelligence, etc. This is advantageous from both the political and the economic viewpoint. Incidentally, corresponding agreements have been

signed on a number of defense systems, and it is a matter of implementing them. [passage omitted]

**CIS Group Examines Nuclear Weapons in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine**

*LD2911183992 Alma-Ata Kazakh Radio Network  
in Russian 0000 GMT 29 Nov 92*

[Text] Representatives of the CIS Combined Armed Forces Main Command and the Russian Ministry of Defense have completed their work in formations and units of the strategic forces deployed on the territory of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. The Main Command's Public Information Center told an ITAR-TASS correspondent that the group assessed the level of combat readiness, the standard of combat duty, and the day-to-day operation of the troops. The need to resolve urgently several problems connected with the activities of these troops was confirmed.

The question of which state should have strategic nuclear weapons must be examined at the next session of the CIS Council of Heads of State. It is because this question remains unresolved that many problems arise.

## REGIONAL AFFAIRS

**Nordic Defense Ministers in Accord on Russian Troops in Baltic**

*PM1811163292 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER  
in Swedish 17 Nov 92 p A9*

[Magdalena Ribbing report: "Sweden Will Not Sell Arms to the Baltic Region"]

[Text] Viborg [Denmark]—All avenues must be exploited to get the Russian troops off Baltic territory. According to the Nordic defense ministers, the Nordic region will act in harmony on the question.

On Monday [16 November] the four Nordic defense ministers met in the medieval Danish city of Viborg to discuss common concerns. The host was Knud Enggaard, and the guests were Finland's Elisabeth Rehn, Norway's Johan Jorgen Holst, and Sweden's Anders Bjorck. In response to a Swedish proposal, the defense ministers decided to set up a committee of experts to take stock of the scope for Nordic cooperation in the field of defense materiel. The committee will report on its work at the next meeting of defense ministers, which will take place in Sweden in May.

The Russian troops are not a security problem, Elisabeth Rehn said, but they are a "source of irritation." The defense ministers are reluctant to establish a link between the withdrawal of Russian troops and the treatment of the Russian minorities in the Baltic states.

Anders Bjorck hinted that the Nordic countries' interest in building up investment in Russia would be limited if the problem of the troops is not solved.

Johan Jorgen Holst will raise the issue during his official visit to Russia next week, he promised.

"We must not pass up any opportunity."

Elisabeth Rehn wanted "some understanding" for the massive upheavals in Russia; we will get nowhere with threats and demands, she said.

"Stability can be best created through a Russia integrated with Europe and with European organizations," Anders Bjorck said.

Anders Bjorck also promised that there will be no arms sales to the Baltic region:

"That would be the wrong sort of signal, as if we were prepared to take some responsibility for the security of the Baltic region—which we are not."

The Swedish defense minister said that the government has agreed not to send troops to protect humanitarian shipments in Somalia. The UN secretary general had privately asked Sweden about this but been told "no." Anders Bjorck said that Sweden does not have the equipment needed—such as vehicles with armor capable of withstanding fragmentation bombs—and that this is very expensive.

"We at the Defense Ministry are prepared to contribute everything that the United Nations requests if the government agrees and if our costs are covered," Anders Bjorck said.

And the defense minister allowed himself to propose a source of income:

"It is not difficult to find the money needed. Put a value-added tax on the daily press."

## GERMANY

**Last CIS Troops Begin Withdrawal From Thuringia**

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21 Nov 92*

[Text] Erfurt (ADN)—The departure of the last CIS troops in Thuringia began this morning with a wreath-laying ceremony at the Russian memorial at Erfurt's main cemetery.

The last CIS troop train with servicemen and equipment will depart from Weimar's freight depot at 1200. Afterwards there will be a military ceremony in the town center as well as a festival with the citizens of Weimar.

According to the Thuringian Interior Ministry, a total of 80,000 servicemen, civilian employees, and dependants of the CIS troops were based in Thuringia, and 1,500 members of the military will remain in this land and hand over the troops' real estate to the German authorities before they, too, return home before the end of the year. Thuringia will be the first eastern land from which all Russian servicemen have been withdrawn.

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